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ABSTRACT 
Over $67 billion in defaulted student loans existed as of March, 2012.  Financial 
services firms stand to gain enormous profits by successfully rehabilitating and collecting 
from these loans.  Therefore, the ability to generate insight as to which borrowers have 
the highest propensity to repay is extremely valuable.  This work addresses this issue via 
the use of three types of analytics. 
Using descriptive and predictive analytics, this work identifies that FICO Score, 
Cumulative GPA, Estimated Family Contribution, Original Balance, Credit Hours 
Earned, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Race / Ethnicity and Segment are the features most 
discriminating between borrowers who will repay and who will not.  Interestingly this set 
of features overlaps the set of features most important for outright student loan default, 
but are not the same.  The work also demonstrates that the distributions of these features 
tend to be non-stationary, as they seem to depend on the time period and collection 
agency from which the data was collected. 
These highly discriminating features, along with the rest in the set, were used in 
the predictive and prescriptive portion of the work in order to generate classifiers.  The 
best possible classifier was a boosted set of decision trees, yielding gains of 34.7% at the 
10% sample level and 63.7% at the 25% sample level.  The model identified $223,154.84 
that could be successfully collected from a small sample of data ranging a one year 
period of time; this total amount would have been ignored by baseline methods.  Scaling 
up the size of the dataset should yield significant returns. 
2 
The last portion of the work addresses the fact that the number of times a 
borrower is successfully contacted by a collection agency is highly related to the amount 
he repays.  The importance of discriminating features was compared across the spectrum 
of the number of contacts in order to generate rules that would indicate borrowers likely 
to answer a collection agency’s call and also repay.  This effort turned out largely 
fruitless as rules were either not generated or insignificant in all of the instances. 
Finally, various opportunities for future work are considered.  Particularly, 
experiments into investigating the correlation between personality traits and the features 
examined here are posed.  Personality traits are likely the driver for many of these 
features and their knowledge would probably strongly improve results. 
  
3 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
$1 trillion.  In March, 2012 it was reported that there existed over $1 trillion in 
outstanding federal student loans – and that was likely reached a few months prior 
(Hechinger 2012a).  Putting this value in perspective -- it surpasses the total sum of 
national credit card debt, it is almost 13 times greater than Apple’s net worth as of 
September, 2011 and it can purchase 1 trillion double cheeseburgers from McDonald’s 
value menu, amounting to 331.25 billion pounds of food.   This comes as the 
accumulation of debt of millions of college attendees, including graduates and non-
graduates, of various types of institutions.  Considering, for example, that 19% of 
bachelor’s degree holders and 13% of those whom didn’t complete their bachelors, who 
started school in 2003, individually accrued over $28,000 in debt – the total value is not 
too hard to accept (Baum & Payea 2011). Needless to say, addressing student loan debt is 
a major issue for the well-being of this nation.  However, perhaps a bigger issue is not the 
level of student loan debt, but rather the level of student loan default.  The amount of 
student loan default has more than doubled since 2003; currently, the figure stands at a 
monstrous $67 billion (Hechinger 2012a, 2012b). 
First, realize there are two main states of unpaid loans, specifically, delinquent 
and defaulted.  When someone stops repaying his loan, i.e. the loan enters the state of 
delinquency, the loan holder must exercise “due diligence” in efforts to collect the loan; 
“due diligence” implies using collection agencies’ repeated efforts to locate and contact 
the debtor with regards to the unpaid loan (FSA Collections).  If these efforts fail, i.e. 
delinquency has continued for 270 days in the case of loans repayable in monthly 
increments or 330 days in the case of loans with less frequent monthly installments, all 
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Federal Family Educational Loans (FFEL)  are considered defaulted.  Once this occurs, 
the loan is passed on to a guaranty agency within the borrower’s home state.   
A guarantor is a nonprofit organization that maintains an agreement with the 
Department of Education to administer all loans under the FFEL program (TG).  Upon 
receipt of a loan, the guarantor is required to pay the outstanding balance of interest and 
principal of the loan back to the lender, provided the lender meets federal requirements.  
Once the guarantor does this, it is responsible for collecting the loan on behalf of the 
federal government.  The guarantor will attempt to establish contact and determine 
payment plans.  If the debtor will not make payment, the following consequences may 
apply: administrative wage garnishment, application of tax refunds towards loan 
repayment, application of collection costs to loan, legal action (lawsuits), notification of 
credit bureaus and subsequent reduction in credit score and many others.  If the guarantor 
is unable to make contact with the borrower or cannot generate repayment, it often 
employs other collection agencies to help with the collection process. 
While the process being described was the existing practice for collecting 
defaulted federal loans under the FFEL program, it is important to note that not all 
student loans are offered through the government.  Federal student loans cover around 
70% of the total student loan debt; the remaining loans are sponsored through private 
entities.  These private entities will use similar processes and methods.  In addition, the 
FFEL program is thought by many to be flawed.  While loans are made by private entities 
in this program, they are subsidized and backed by the government.  President Obama 
commented that this type of loan basically pays banks to act as a middleman between the 
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government lenders and student recipients.  This program was recently eliminated in the 
Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009; now all federal loans are under the 
Direct Loan program.  The middleman is now essentially removed, as the government 
lends directly to students; this program is expected to save the government an estimated 
$80 billion over 10 years.  Despite these changes, the government will still employ 
collection agencies as a means to collect defaulted debt. 
Collection agencies are highly vested in actually generating repayments for their 
assigned loans.  Under Department of Education contracts, collectors that can 
successfully rehabilitate a loan, i.e. generate nine payments in ten months to remove a 
loan’s defaulted status, can earn up to 16% of the entire loan amount as commission.  
Debt collection agencies helped recover $11.3 billion in defaulted loans last year, 
resulting in over $1 billion in commission (Hechinger 2012b).  Clearly, collection 
agencies with insight into which customers are likely to repay will have a significant 
competitive advantage. 
These advanced insights can be achieved through the analytic work of separate 
financial institutions; one such company is the client in this Master’s thesis project.  The 
client is a nationally recognized consulting firm that has been serving the financial 
services industry for over three decades with an extensive range of integrated credit and 
capital markets solutions, including student loan portfolio management.  It works with 
schools, lenders, servicers, collection agencies and other owners of student loan 
portfolios to reduce defaults and losses and increase collections.  The company has 
developed a model, its Student Loan “Gain Model”, which attempts to categorize loans 
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and assign probabilities of repayment for each account.  In assigning these propensities, it 
can direct collection agencies as to how they can best utilize their efforts.  While the 
model seems to be outperforming random guessing, i.e. the model can lead to better 
conclusions as to which accounts will make repayment better than random guessing 
would, the client felt that it can do better; it was just not sure how. 
Consequently, the company chose to sponsor a project with the Enterprise 
Systems Center of Lehigh University to investigate the issue; this master’s thesis is a 
direct result of this effort.  The main objectives of this work are, given a dataset of 
numerous features related to the borrower and status of a loan: identify features that 
discriminate well between nonpayers and payers for borrowers who have defaulted, 
generate models to both classify which accounts will make repayment given default and 
generate the propensity for repayment, and lastly to develop profiles of easy-to and hard-
to-influence borrowers that will enable collections agencies to work with greater 
efficiency.  Each of these objectives is to be achieved through the use of advanced 
analytics. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter will evaluate a plethora of resources relating to the problem of 
determining what factors relate to an individual defaulting on his/her student loans.  Note 
that one of the goals of this thesis is to determine the features related to making 
repayment given that default has already occurred, not determining the features related to 
outright default.  As little to no research exists on the problem at hand, this somewhat 
related issue is considered instead.  Chapters 3 and 4 look to verify or disprove that the 
features reviewed here are truly related to making repayment after default. 
2.1 Borrower Background 
Age 
There is a positive correlation between the age of the borrower and the likelihood 
of student loan default – the chance of default increases with age.  This still occurs even 
after controlling for important factors, such as income (Christman 2000; Harrast 2004; 
Herr & Burt 2005; Podgursky, Ehlert, Monroe, Watson & Wittstruck 2002; Steiner & 
Teszler 2005; Woo 2002a, 2002b).  Flint (1997) even determined that every year of age 
beyond 21 increases the probability of default by three percent. 
Herr & Burt (2005) put forth one possible explanation, suggesting that older 
borrowers likely have more financial commitments than younger borrowers, i.e. a family 
to support.  As many of these commitments will probably take precedence over student 
loan repayment, older borrowers will be less likely to repay than their younger 
counterparts.  A second explanation relates to total student debt.  Harrast (2004) found 
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that $312, on average, is added to a student’s cumulative debt load each year and Choy & 
Li (2006) found that as cumulative debt increases, so does the probability of default.  
Consequently, older students have greater debt burdens than younger students and 
therefore are less likely to repay.  A third reason may be that older students have 
weakened ties to parents and those who would normally provide financial assistance, 
thereby increasing the chance of default (Woo 2002b). 
There was one study, by Steiner & Teszler (2003), which found contradictory 
results.  The investigation reviewed a single four-year public institution (Texas A&M 
University) and found that younger students were three times more likely to default than 
older students.  A later study at the same institution by the same authors could not 
reproduce these results, questioning the finding. 
Ethnicity 
The effects of ethnicity on student loan default have been widely studied in the 
literature, with quite consistent findings; students who are not Caucasian have a higher 
chance of default than Caucasian students (Christman 2000; Harrast 2004; Volkwein & 
Cabrera 1998; Volkwein & Szelest 1995; Woo 2002a, 2002b).  More specifically, 
African Americans are of the greatest risk (Greene 1989; Herr & Burt 2005; Knapp & 
Seaks 1992; Podgursky et al. 2002; Steiner & Teszler 2003; Wilms, Moore & Bolus 
1987) even after controlling for post-graduation income (Boyd 1997; Lochner & Monge-
Naranjo 2004), increasing the likelihood of default by 11.7 percent (Flint 1997).  African 
Americans were also found to be less likely to resume repayment after default when 
compared to Caucasian or Asian American students (Volkwein, Szelest, Cabrera & 
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Napierski-Prancl 1998).  Being of American Indian descent can increase the chance of 
default (Volkwein et al. 1998) as can being of Hispanic descent (Volkwein & Cabrera 
1998).   
On the other hand, being of Caucasian or Asian American descent is associated 
with lower default rates (Volkwein et al. 1998).  Interestingly, the variables that reduce 
default are largely the same across all ethnic groups, but the influence on non-Caucasians 
is larger than it is for Caucasians, i.e. being female and married lowers the default rate 
more drastically for non-Caucasians than for Caucasians. 
As the length of literature implies, the race/ethnicity of an individual is a very 
strong predictor of default (Harrast 2004).  A study at a four-year private institution 
indicated that ethnicity was the second most predictive factor for default, aside from 
college graduation, accounting for 20 percent of the variance (Herr & Burt 2005).  This 
finding can be generalized as the relationship holds regardless of institution type 
(Dynarski 1994). 
Little is understood about the underlying factors as to why ethnicity or race can 
have such an important factor on default.  One possible reason is that non-Caucasian 
students are more likely to borrow and therefore can incur greater amounts of debt by the 
time of graduation (Harrat 2004; Wilms et al. 1987), and as mentioned above, greater 
amounts of debt are associated with more default.  Post-graduation, non-Caucasians are 
more likely to be unemployed and less likely to be satisfied with their educational 
experience (Volkwein et al. 1998), adding a second reason why this group may be more 
unlikely to repay.  Stretching, Boyd (1997) suggests that discrimination in the housing 
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market regardless of one’s earned degree or credit worthiness can reduce the incentive of 
borrowers to protect their score by repaying their loans.  Volkwein et al. (1998) also 
found that borrowers of all ethnic groups with similar degrees, marital status and family 
size have almost identical records of post-graduation income and loan repayment; this 
suggests that degree completion, marital status and dependent children are significant 
factors in loan repayment.  African Americans and Hispanics have lower levels of degree 
completion, lower levels of academic success, close to twice the amount of children and 
twice the separation/divorce rate as opposed to Caucasians, providing yet another 
explanation for this empirical phenomenon. 
Gender 
There is mixed results pertaining to gender’s effect on student loan default.  
Studies have found that females are more likely to repay their loans as opposed to males 
(Podgursky et al. 2002).  Flint (1997) found that being male increases the likelihood of 
default by 5.8 percent, while Woo (2002b) found that being female decreased the chance 
of default by an enormous 36 percent.  Another investigation found that females took 
longer to repay loans than males (Choy & Li 2006). 
On the flip side, other studies have found no important distinction between 
females and males in loan repayment (Harrast 2004; Knapp & Seaks 1992; Volkwein and 
Szelest 1995; Wilms et al. 1987), even after considering womens’ comparatively lower 
post-graduation salaries and repayment issues (Shwartz & Finne 2002). 
Family Structure 
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A borrower’s family structure and status can affect the likelihood of default in 
many ways.  First off, student borrowers who were close to their families, and therefore 
could depend on them for support, were found to be less likely to default than those 
without family support (Volkwein et al. 1998; Woo 2002a, 2002b).   
Next, as the number of dependents of the borrower increases, so does the chance 
of default (Dynarski 1994; Volkwein & Szelest 1995; Woo 2002b).  Volkwein and 
Szelest (1995) quantified this relationship, determining that the likelihood of default 
increased 4.5 percent with each additional dependent.  The reasoning behind this finding 
is intuitive; dependents pose immediate and relentless financial obligations.  These 
commitments are undoubtedly going to be taken care of before a student loan is repaid, 
i.e. a borrower would feed a dependent before making payment on a student loan.  More 
dependents increase this commitment and consequently drive down the chance of 
repayment (Herr & Burt 2005).   
Being a single parent was also found to increase the probability of default 
(Volkwein et al. 1998).  Knapp & Seaks (1992) found that the presence of both parents 
reduces the probability of default by roughly 2.7 percent, while the absence of a father 
increases this probability by 2.5 percent.  Volkwein and Szelest (1995) later confirmed 
this, finding that being separated, divorced or widowed increased the probability of 
default by over 7 percent.   
Family Income 
As common sense would imply, as a family’s income grows higher the resulting 
chance of student loan default diminishes (Knapp & Seaks 1992; Wilms et al. 1987; Woo 
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2002a, 2002b).    Students from low-income families generally incur more debt during 
school (Herr & Burt 2005; Steiner & Teszler 2005; Volkwein & Szelest 1995) and feel 
more burdened once repayments begin (Baum & O’ Malley 2003b).  This combination of 
higher levels of debt and greater feelings of burden pose a logical reason for this 
additional default.  Higher income families can also provide financial safety nets for 
students to repay their loans, especially as personal income may change. 
Quantifying this relationship, Knapp & Seaks (1992) found that an increase of 
$1,000 in income lowered the risk of default by 0.2 percent and a $10,000 increase in 
income lowers the risk of default by 2 percent.  Volkwein et al. (1998) also found that 
families with income over $30,000 were associated with lower default rates. 
Parental Education 
Students whose parents had college educations were found to be less likely to 
default than first-generation college students (Choy & Li 2006; Volkwein et al. 1998; 
Volkwein & Szelest 1995).  This relationship exists for both the mother’s and father’s 
level of education (Steiner & Teszler 2003, 2005).   
2.2 College Academics 
Completion of Degree 
The literature overwhelmingly indicates that completing one’s degree program,  
or equivalently graduating, is the strongest single predictor of not defaulting (California 
Postsecondary 2006; Dynarski 1994; Greene 1989; Knapp & Seaks 1992; Thein and Herr 
2001; Volkwein & Cabrera 1998; Volkwein et al. 1998; Woo 2002b).  Thein and Herr 
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(2001) found that a borrower’s highest degree attained accounted for 27 percent of the 
variation in default behavior in a study at the Univeristy of Texas at Austin, which was 
far greater than any other variable.  Steiner & Teszler (2003) found, in a study at a four-
year public institution, that students who did not graduate had nearly a 14 percent default 
rate while those who did graduate had less than a 2 percent default rate.  This study also 
showed that the importance of degree completion in relation to low default rates exists 
regardless of degree type (i.e. Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Arts, etc.).   
Progress towards one’s degree is also indicative of a lower default chance.  Herr 
& Burt (2005) found that at the start of repayment, students with enough credits to be 
considered senior standing were less likely to default than those with junior standing, and 
similarly down the line. 
Podgursky et al. (2002) considered that the relationship between degree 
completion (or progress toward degree completion) and default may reflect student 
sorting, where students who are more prone to default are the ones who are also more 
likely to end their college experiences before completing their degree. 
GPA and Academic Success 
While completion of degree is the strongest single predictor of loan default, the 
collection of credits attempted, credits completed, credits failed, grades, enrollment 
patterns and time to degree emerge as the strongest predictors of loan default.  As many 
of these variables are conveniently and succinctly summarized in GPA, it is yet another 
significant predictor.  As expected, higher GPAs are related with lower default rates 
(Christman 2000; Flint 1997; Steiner & Teszler 2003; Volkwein et al. 1998; Volkwein & 
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Szelest 1995; Woo 2002b).  Woo (2002b) found that a half grade increase in GPA, i.e. 
0.50 on a 4.0 scale, reduced the likelihood of default by 14 percent. 
In their study at a four-year public institution, Steiner & Teszler (2003) found that 
GPA was the strongest forecaster of default.  The default rate of students with a GPA of 
2.0 or less was nearly 18 percent, the default rate of students with a GPA of 2.5 or more 
was 2 percent or less and the default rate of students with a GPA of 3.0 or more was 1 
percent or less.  At this particular institution, borrower who had less than a 2.5 GPA 
accounted for 82.5 percent of all defaults, indicating that poor academic success implies 
higher default rates.  This is consistent with another finding in their study; the more credit 
hours failed, the more likely a student is to default.  Christman (2000) also had the same 
finding in a national study of two-year public schools. 
Interestingly, Volkwein & Szelest (1995) noted that GPA may be a proxy for 
ability and motivation, two traits associated with success in college and later life. 
Structure and Length of Enrollment 
Generally, students who enroll continuously are less likely to default than students 
who leave school for whatever reason (Christman 2000; Harrast 2004; Podgursky et al. 
2002; Steiner & Teszler 2003, 2005; Woo 2002b).  Steiner & Teszler (2003) found that 
default rates tend to rise as the number of times withdrawn rises.  They also noted that 
students who withdrew for administrative or academic reasons had higher default rates 
than students who withdrew for work-related reasons.  Podgursky et al. (2002) found that 
the general result was not driven by completion of degree, as students who did not 
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graduate but were continuously enrolled had a much lower likelihood of default than non-
graduates with non-continuous enrollment. 
There exists a somewhat complex relationship between the length of enrollment 
and student loan default; there exists higher chance of default for students enrolled very 
short periods of time and very long periods of time.  Steiner & Teszler (2003) found, in 
their study of a particular university, that students enrolled only 1-4 semesters have 
higher default rates than students enrolled for lengthier periods.  They also found that 
students who leave after one year or less default at a rate of 14 percent, whereas those 
who leave after two to five years have comparatively low default rates.  On the other 
hand, undergraduates who have six or more years between when they first attended and 
their most recent departure have high default rates.  This holds without regard for degree 
completion, as students who graduate after six or more years have much higher default 
rates than those who finish in five years or less. 
Steiner & Teszler (2003) additionally determined that students who took classes 
during two summer semesters had a default rate of 2.9 percent, while those who did not 
take classes during any summer semester had a default rate of 8.9 percent. 
There were mixed opinions as to how transfer behavior was related to default in 
the literature.  Woo (2002a, 2002b) found that students who attended more than one 
school were less likely to default than students who were only enrolled at one school.  
However, this finding is suspect as the study included graduate students, who are less 
prone to default and often attend multiple institutions.  Volkwein et al. (1998) also found 
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that transferring credits was related to not defaulting.  Herr & Burt (2005), although, 
found the opposite – students who transferred credits were more likely to default. 
Major 
A student’s major at school affects the chance of default mainly via the amount of 
debt occurred and post-graduation earnings.  Harrast (2004) found that studying special 
education, computer engineering, sociology, art history or risk management and 
insurance was associated with higher levels of debt, which in turn will lead to higher 
default rates.  This study focused only on one institution and the author was unsure as to 
why a particular major would affect debt burden.  A stronger notion is that post-
graduation earnings related to one’s field of study will affect personal income and 
therefore one’s ability to repay (Flint 1997; Herr & Burt 2005; Steiner & Teszler 2005; 
Volkwein & Szelest 1995).  However, the greater the incongruence between a students’ 
field of study and field of current employment, the higher the risk of default (Flint 1997). 
Steiner & Teszler (2003) found that general studies majors have a higher default 
rate, 14.7 percent, than other majors.  However, this study was done again at a single 
school.  Volkwein & Szelest (1995) found that scientific, engineering or agricultural 
majors had over 4 percent lower default probability among two-year, four-year and 
university borrowers. 
Students who changed majors once or twice were found to have lower default 
rates, whereas those who changed more than twice were found to have higher rates 
(Steiner & Teszler 2003).  This study also found that students with double majors had 
lower default rates than those who did not. 
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Institution Type 
Students attending less-than-two-year, proprietary or community colleges have 
higher default rates than students attending four-year or more selective schools 
(Podgursky et al. 2002; Woo 2002a, 2002b).  Some authors in the research pose that this 
disparity exists mainly because different institutions attract different types of students 
(Volkwein et al. 1998; Woo 2002b).  For example, students who attend proprietary or 
less-than-four-year institutions tend to borrow more, come from lower-income families 
and belong to a racial or ethnic minority – all characteristics associated with higher 
default probabilities (Gladieux & Perna 2005; Goodwin 1991).  This thought was further 
confirmed when borrowing behaviors, student background characteristics and 
institutional resources were considered, the differences in institution type and default rate 
largely disappeared (Emmert 1978; Flint 1997; Knapp & Seaks 1992; Volkwein & 
Cabrera 1998; Volkwein et al. 1998; Wilms et al. 1987). 
A possible reason for any small relationship between institution type and loan 
default lies with institutional wealth.  Four-year or more selective schools are generally 
wealthier than their two-year-or-less, proprietary or community college counterparts.  
Wealthier institutions have greater ability to provide students with social and economic 
capital, therefore lowering students’ chance of default. 
Advanced Education 
Borrowers who go on to attend graduate or profession school default at lower 
rates than students who do not.  While these students incur more debt and spend more 
time in school, factors associated with higher default risk, they are generally very 
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academically successful and have great prospects in the job market, factors associated 
with low default risk. 
Exit Counseling 
Steiner & Teszler (2003) found that students who received in-person exit 
counseling had a default rate of 1.3 percent, whereas students who did not receive this 
had an 11.1 percent default rate.  This may be due to the fact that almost all students who 
graduate receive in-person exit counseling, but few who do not graduate receive it. 
In a larger study, Flint (1997) found little relationship between exit-counseling 
and default. 
Student Employment 
Volkwein et al. (1998) found that working in college lowered defaults by 7.5 
percent for non-Caucasian students, but had no influence on Caucasian students.  The 
study did not look at the amount of hours worked, only if the student worked or not. 
Academic Preparedness 
Given how strongly related collegiate academic success is to student loan default, 
it logically follows that academic preparedness, i.e. high school rank, high school GPA 
and standardized test scores, is also strongly related to default.  As one’s high school 
rank, high school GPA and standardized test scores increased, the probability of default 
generally decreased (Christman 2000; Podgursky et al. 2002; Steiner & Teszler 2003; 
Woo 2002b).  For example, Steiner & Teszler (2003) found that borrowers whose high 
school class rank was below the 25th percentile had a 12.8 percent default rate, while 
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borrowers at or above the 90th percentile had a 3.2 percent default rate.  They also saw 
that borrowers with a combined verbal and math SAT score below 900 had a default rate 
of 6.9 percent but borrowers with a combined SAT score of 901 to 1400 had a default 
rate of 4.4 percent.  In this study, though, the majority of students had SAT scores above 
900.  However, a study by Lochner & Monge-Naranjo (2004) found a “U-shaped” 
relationship between standardized test performance and default; low- and high-scoring 
students were more likely to default than students with mid-range scores. 
Christman (2000) found that having a GED instead of a high school diploma was 
associated with a higher default rate. 
2.3 Debt and Loans 
Level of Debt 
As alluded to earlier, high levels of debt burden are associated with high 
probabilities of default.  The more a student borrows, the greater the chance of default, 
regardless of institution type (Choy & Li 2006; Dynarski 1994; Lochner & Monge-
Naranjo 2004). 
A study by California Postsecondary (2006) showed that students attending two-
year and proprietary schools in 2003-2004 owed over $38,000 on average, whereas 
students attending private four-year schools owed roughly $36,000.  Similarly, a national 
study found students who attend proprietary schools spent a higher proportion of their 
monthly income (roughly 8 percent) on repayments as opposed to students who attended 
four-year schools (roughly 6 percent). 
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Manageability, or unmanageability, of monthly payments is strongly related to 
student loan default (Dynarski 1994).  Students who owed lots of money reported lots of 
difficulties in repaying loans, regardless of default status (Schwartz & Finnie 2002).  If a 
borrower’s monthly debt burden exceeds 8 percent of monthly income, the debt is 
considered unmanageable.  Choy & Li (2006) found that 11 percent of borrowers had 
unmanageable debt in 2003, where more than 20 percent of them went on to default. 
The big exception to this conclusion is students who incur high levels of debt on 
their way to graduate school (Volkwein et al. 1998; Woo 2002a, 2002b).  Steiner & 
Teszler (2003) also found that students who took out $5,000 or less in loans defaulted at a 
much higher rate than all borrowers.  These borrowers were more likely to stay in school 
only a short time and not graduate.  Therefore, this second exception seems to be more of 
a proxy for academic success and length of enrollment. 
Attitude towards Debt 
There have been relatively few studies investigating the relationship between 
borrowers’ attitudes towards debt and the chance of default.  Christman (2000) concluded 
that student attitudes were related to default.  Although two-thirds of students in a 
national survey stated that loans were very important for their college education, 
differences in attitudes towards debt by ethnicity and income were apparent (Baum & 
O’Malley 2003a).  African American borrowers reported feeling more burdened by the 
debt and less satisfied that the benefits of borrowing outweighed the costs.  Low-income 
students who received Pell grants also reported feeling more burdened by the debt, and 
the perception is increasing.  As the ratio of monthly income to debt payment increases, 
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so does the negative perception of debt.  As this negative perception of debt increases, 
just as with debt burden and unmanageability, the likelihood of default increases. 
Pinto & Mansfield (2006) determined that students with high levels of educational 
debt were also very likely to have significant credit card debt.  These borrowers generally 
prioritized the repayment of the credit card debt before the repayment of the student loan 
debt. 
Some research has explored how loan counseling or consumer education 
programs relate to default, and have found that participating in such programs relates to 
lower levels of default (Podgursky et al. 2002; Seifert & Worden 2004; Steiner & Teszler 
2005; Wilms et al. 1987).  However, it is unclear whether the programs themselves are 
the cause of the drop in default rate or rather if the types of individuals seeking these 
programs are generally less prone to default. 
Awareness of Repayment Obligation 
A study by Volkwein et al. (1998) determined that awareness of the obligation to 
repay one’s student loan is not a strong factor in default, as 93 percent of those surveyed 
realized the loan had to be repaid.  One in four, though, was confused by the repayment 
process and three in four were not aware of loan deferment options. 
Stages in the Repayment Process 
Borrowers who have ever been in deferment or forebearance were found to be 
less likely to default.  This may be because borrowers who are organized and aware 
enough to follow through with deferments are likely better able to repay in general (Woo 
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2002b).  Conversely, borrowers who went into delinquency more than once were more 
likely to default.  In the same study, Woo found that each period of delinquency 
increased the chance of default by 4.8 percentage points. 
Follow-up studies of defaulters showed that two of three reported making 
payments since the initial default.   Surprisingly, 31 percent actually completed payment 
(Volkwein & Cabrera 1998). 
Financial Aid 
There exists mixed evidence as to a relationship between financial aid and student 
loan default.  Common sense would suggest that as financial aid goes down, the debt 
burden on students will increase as will the default rate.  Similarly, if financial aid goes 
up, the debt burden would be reduced and so should the likelihood of default.  Greene 
(1989) was able to demonstrate this at one traditional four-year institution.  A study at 
another four-year school by Steiner & Teszler (2003) found, contrarily, that the amount 
of aid, the number and types of loans, and loan consolidation had no effect on default. 
Loan Servicing 
Students with loans held by more than one servicer were found to be more likely 
to default (Flint 1997; Woo 2002b).  Woo found that each additional servicer increased 
the chance of default by 18 percent.  Woo also found that the number of loans, but not the 
amount borrowed, positively correlates to default likelihood.  A possible reason could be 
that as the number of servicers and loans rise, the manageability and ease of payment 
goes down.  With this, the likelihood of default rises. 
23 
2.4 Post-College Life 
Unemployment 
In a national survey, 59 percent of borrowers indicated that one of the most 
important reasons for default was being unemployed (Volkwein et al. 1998).  A separate 
study found that 83 percent of borrowers who attended proprietary school and 74 percent 
of students who attend two-year schools indicated that being unemployed was very or 
somewhat important reasons for defaulting (Dynarski 1994).   
Woo (2002b) found that the strongest post-school variable associated with default 
is filing for unemployment insurance.  Borrowers who were unemployed demonstrated an 
83 percent increase in the probability of default over their standard chance. 
Income 
As expected, borrowers with high incomes after leaving school are less likely to 
default than those with low incomes (Herr & Burt 2005; Steiner & Teszler 2005; 
Volkwein & Szelest 1995).  A borrower’s post-school income was only half as strong as 
post-school unemployment or lack of degree completion in predicting default (Woo 
2002b). 
In a national study, 49 percent of people indicated that working for low wages 
was one of the main reasons for defaulting (Volkwein et al. 1998).  A separate study 
found 69 percent of four-year school borrowers were working but had insufficient funds 
to repay student loans.  Volkwein et al. (1998) found that borrowers with incomes greater 
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than $25,000 were associated with lower default rates, whereas borrowers with incomes 
less than $10,000 were associated with higher default rates. 
Flint (1997) determined that having an adequate disposable income is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for repaying towards a student loan.  Interestingly, many 
borrowers with low incomes who had the ability to repay still chose not to do so. 
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CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYTICS - DATA ANALYSIS AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
Descriptive analytics will be used in this chapter in order to establish insights 
about the features within the provided datasets.  Specifically, insights will be developed 
via the analysis of the input feature distributions and the correlations between all input 
features.  The goal of the analysis is to develop understanding as to which features yield 
predictive value in the problem of determining who will repay given default, i.e. which 
features will be best able to discriminate between nonpayment and payment classes. 
The following features were determined to be most important when 
discriminating between nonpayers and payers, in order of importance: Age, Credit Hours 
Earned, Credit Hours Failed, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Cumulative GPA, Dependency, 
Estimated Family Contribution, FICO Score, Gender, High School Credential, Original 
Balance, Race / Ethnicity, Segment, Student AGI and Student Status. 
3.1 Dataset 
The client provided us with two data sets from two different collection agencies, 
related to the loans made by a specific technical school. We focus here on the more 
extensive data set, which had the following features: 
• ID Number: an identifier of the account within the file. 
• Client Account Number: the account identification number. 
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• School: the particular campus of the school attended by the 
borrower. 
• State: the home state of the borrower. 
• Zip: the home zip code of the borrower. 
• List Date: the date the loan was listed at the given collections 
agency. 
• Close Date: the date the loan was closed at the given collections 
agency. 
• Days Since Placement: the total time the loan was placed at the 
given collections agency.  Also known as Days Placed. 
• Date of First Payment: the date of the first payment made, if one is 
made, by the borrower towards the loan.  This payment, if made, occurs 
after the listing date. 
• Amount of First Payment: the amount of the first payment made by 
the borrower towards the loan. 
• Time to First Payment: the number of days between the account 
listing and the first payment, if ever made. 
• Date of Last Payment: the date of the last payment, if one is made, 
by the borrower towards the loan.  This payment, if made, occurs after the 
listing date. 
• Amount of Last Payment: the amount of the last payment made by 
the borrower towards the loan. 
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• Amount Collected: the total amount collected towards the loan 
throughout its placement at the given collections agency. 
• Reason for Close: comments about why the account was closed; 
can take on many values. 
• Balance: the balance at the time the account was placed at the 
given collections agency. 
• Net Balance: the balance of the account when leaving the 
collection agency; is equal to Balance – Amount Collected. 
• FICO Score: the TransUnion FICO credit score of the borrower at 
the time the loan was placed at the given collections agency. 
• Score: the credit score assigned by the collections agency.  As this 
is specific to one collections agency, and it’s unknown how they generated 
the value, this not be considered. 
• Home Phone:  a binary variable indicating whether or not the 
borrower listed a phone number for his/her home. 
• POE Phone: a binary variable indicating whether or not the 
borrower listed a phone number for his/her place-of-employment. 
• Phone Attempts: the number of times the collection agency called 
the borrower, including both when the borrower answered and did not. 
• Successful Contacts: the number of times the borrower answered a 
phone call from the collection agency. 
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• Contact Hit Rate: the number of successful debtor contacts per the 
number of phone attempts for each borrower; defined as long as the 
number of phone  .attempts is greater than zero 
• Letters: the number of letters the collection agency sent to the 
debtor. 
• Segment: cluster assigned by client to the borrower; uses balance 
and FICO. 
• Loan Equity: the percentage of the original balance paid off at the 
given collection agency. 
Categories such as Date of First Payment, Amount of First Payment, Date of Last 
Payment and Amount of Last Payment describe transactional information about each 
account; this sort of transactional information seems to have not been studied previously 
in the literature. The major problem with these transactional features is the timeframe of 
reference.  A model of the type to be built in this work will evaluate borrowers at their 
time of placement/listing at a new collections agency.  Given the date of first and last 
payments in this case are after the placement date at this particular collections agency, 
they are unusable as predictors since they theoretically have not yet occurred.  If similar 
information about dates and amounts of payments after placement at previous collection 
agencies were available, then these would be able to predict dates and amounts of 
payments at the current collection agency; these are unavailable at this time. 
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Some of the aforementioned fields will be ignored in modeling as they provide 
little value.  For example, ID number, Client Account Number, School, State and Zip will 
remain unused as they will provide little to no value in prediction. 
The following features are associated with the background group: 
• Birthdate: the birthdate of the borrower 
• Age: the age of the borrower at the time the loan was placed at the 
given collections agency 
• Gender: the gender of the borrower 
• Race/Ethnicity: the race/ethnicity of the borrower; either African-
American, American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islander, Caucasian, 
Hispanic, Two or More Races or Other/Unknown 
• Citizenship: the U.S. citizenship status of the borrower; either U.S. 
Citizen, U.S. Citizen (U.S. National), Eligible Non-Citizen, Not a Citizen 
and Not an Eligible Non-Citizen or Unknown 
• Dependent: whether the borrower is the dependent in a family; 
either Dependent, Independent or Unknown 
• Parents Attended College?: whether the borrower’s parents 
attended college; either Y or N 
• Highest Degree Father:  the highest degree attained by the 
borrower’s father; either College or Beyond, High School, Middle School 
/ Junior High or Other/Unknown 
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• Highest Degree Mother:  the highest degree attained by the 
borrower’s father; either College or Beyond, High School, Middle School 
/ Junior High or Other/Unknown 
• Parent AGI: the aggregated gross income (AGI) of the borrower’s 
parents 
• Student AGI: the aggregated gross income (AGI) of the borrower 
• Estimated Family Contribution: the estimated amount the 
borrower’s family contributes to his education 
These features correspond to those considered in the review of literature.  All of 
Age, Gender, Family Structure (via Dependent), Parental Education (via Parents 
Attended College and their Highest Degrees), and Parental and Student Income were all 
mentioned in the factors that affect default.  For the purpose of this analysis and the 
development of models, it is assumed that these factors are also important in determining 
borrowers who will repay after default and not only borrowers who default. 
A number of the fields within this group had records with ambiguous meaning.  
Many times zero is an acceptable value for a field, i.e. a student’s Wonderlic score could 
actually be zero, but the value zero was also used as a missing/null indicator, i.e. if a 
student’s Wonderlic score was unknown it would also be listed as zero.  This is a quite 
significant issue, as a borrower having such a low score can be very important in 
prediction; on the other hand, not knowing the borrower’s score yields no value.   
One option is to discard every record with ambiguous meaning; this is undesirable 
as there are many other features within these records which yield important information.  
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This leads to the second option: set all ambiguous values to null.  In other words, instead 
of throwing out the entire record, just throw out the particular ambiguous values; this can 
be achieved by setting these values to missing/null.  Many of these ambiguous values 
were likely null to begin with, so there may not be much actually thrown out; however, 
this cannot be said with certainty.  A similar third option is instead of setting all 
ambiguous values to null, impute them with some intelligent scheme.  A possible 
intelligent scheme in imputing the ambiguous value of one record, i.e. record 1, would be 
to find other similar records, i.e. similar according to the other features, and set the 
ambiguous value of record 1 to the average of respective field for those other records.  
We chose the second option and set all ambiguous values to null. 
The next set of features is associated with the academics group: 
• Student Status: whether the student has graduated or dropped from 
college 
• Year of Study: the year-of-study in which the borrower took out 
the student loan 
• Cumulative GPA: the borrower’s cumulative GPA at the time of 
placement at the collections agency; can take on 1st year 
graduate/professional, 1st year undergraduate & attended college before, 
1st year & attended college before, 1st year & never attended college 
before, 2nd year undergraduate / sophomore, 3rd year undergraduate / 
junior, 4th year undergraduate / senior, 5th year / other undergraduate, 
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Continuing graduate / professional, Continuing graduate / professional or 
beyond, or Unknown 
• Credit Hours Failed?:  a binary variable indicating whether or not 
the borrower has failed any credit hours at the time of placement; either Y 
or N 
• Credit Hours Failed: the number of credit hours that the borrower 
has failed by the time of placement 
• Credit Hours Earned: the number of credit hours that the borrower 
has earned by the time of placement 
• Credit Hours Attempted: the number of credit hours that the 
borrower has attempted by the time of placement 
• Academic Probation Flag: a binary variable indicating whether or 
not the has been on academic probation during his/her studies 
• Program of Study: the program of study of the borrower; can take 
on many values 
• High School Credential: whether or not the borrower has received 
a high-school diploma or GED 
• WONDERLIC Test Score: the borrower’s score on the 
WONDERLIC test, an intelligence test used to assess aptitude for learning 
and problem-solving 
This group of features contains many studied in the review of literature, some of 
which are suggested to be the greatest predictors of default (and  intuitively repayment). 
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All of Completion of Degree (via Student Status), GPA and Academic Success (via 
Cumulative GPA & Credit Hour Failed? & Credit Hours Failed & Credit Hours Earned & 
Credit Hours Attempted), Major (via Program of Study) and Academic Preparedness (via 
High School Credential) were studied in the review of literature. 
Unfortunately, the issue of data uncertainty arises again with this set.  As with the 
examples earlier, while zero is an acceptable value for many features, it is also used as 
the null identifier.  In order to correct for this, as with the earlier issues, the ambiguous 
data points were set to null.   
The last feature pertains to the post-college group: 
• Job Status: whether the borrower is currently employed or of 
unknown status 
This feature is also suggested to be of great predictive value in repayment. 
As a quick summary of the dataset, there are a total of 19,280 records.  Of these, 
16,650 (86.36%) are nonpayers and therefore 2,629 (13.64%) are payers.  Of these 2,629, 
1,075 (40.89%) pay less than $500 and 1,554 (59.11%) pay $500 or more.  This can be 
seen in Table 1 and Table 2 .  These percentages differ from the payer/nonpayer 
percentages in the simpler data set, suggesting different populations. Therefore, our 
insights are not meant to identify generalizable features but to point out descriptive 
analytics pertaining to these sets.  
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Table 1: Distribution of Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
 
Table 2: Distribution of Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ in Payers Group 
We next consider the distribution of ages within the dataset.  Traditionally when 
one thinks of college students, young adults in their early 20s usually come to mind.  As 
seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 this intuition is somewhat correct as overall 32.34% of 
borrowers are in the 20-24 year old range.  Over 78% of the overall borrowers are 
between 16-34, leaving less than a quarter above this range.  The majority of students 
(specifically delinquent borrowers) in the data set are relatively young.   
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Figure 1: Distribution of Age for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Age for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
We now discuss how repayment is correlated with age. Take, for example, the 16-
19 year old age range which consists of 8.81% of the borrowers.  If being in this age 
range has no bearing on the likelihood of repayment, one would expect that the 
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percentage of nonpayers, payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or more in this age 
range to be the same as the overall distribution, i.e. 8.81%.  In this case, this is not what 
happens.  Even though only 8.81% of the total borrowers are between the ages of 16 and 
19, there exist 14.57% of payers of less than $500 in this range.  This significant 
difference means that being in the 16-19 age range suggests a higher likelihood of 
repayment of less than $500, as opposed to say nonpayers which consist of 8.04% of 16-
19 year olds.  The same applies for payers of $500 or more. 
To formulate this another way, the value of a bin for a given class, i.e. nonpayers 
or payers of less than $500 or payers of $500 or more, is greater than the value of the bin 
for the overall distribution, then this particular bin is indicative of that class.  Following 
the previous example, being in the 16-19 range indicates the likelihood of payment of 
less than $500.  On the other hand, if the value of a bin for a given class is less than the 
value of the bin for the overall distribution, then this particular bin is not indicative of 
that class.  Note that two classes may be indicated as likely, as seen in the example.  
Being a payer of less than $500 and being a payer of $500 or more are both more likely 
than being a nonpayer. 
Continuing the analysis along these lines, it can be determined that being in the 
16-24 range or the 45+ range is rather indicative of payment.  On the other hand, being in 
the 25-44 range is rather indicative of nonpayment.  This claim seems to somewhat go 
along with the review of literature (except for the 45+ group), which suggested that older 
people tend to make payment less often than younger individuals.  Those in the 16-24 age 
range likely have no commitments and can make payments, while many of those in the 
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25-44 range have families and make payments to other commitments before repaying 
student loans; these explanations definitely make sense.  The anomaly from the review of 
literature is the oldest age group, from 45 and older.  Possibly these individuals have 
families but no longer have dependents, i.e. their children moved out, and therefore can 
make repayment.   
Note that some of the records were eliminated for analysis for age as the data did 
not actually make sense.  Records with supposed ages below 16 or over 70 were removed 
due to the likelihood of errors upon input.   
3.2 Input Distributions of Loan Related Features 
We now study the distribution of amount collected. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Amount Collected  
Knowing the time until the first payment made on an account is very important as it can 
direct the collection agency or financial services firm as to when they should expect 
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incoming cash flows.  By knowing the individuals likely to pay quickly, they can 
possibly direct more efforts towards these borrowers and realize their payments.   
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Time to First Payment 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Time to First Payment for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we learn that for both payers of less than $500 and $500 
or more, the largest time to payment range is between zero and 25 days, capturing about 
29.5% of payers of less than $500 and 35.5% of payers of $500 or more.  The trend 
gradually decreases to its minimum range of between 150 and 175 days, capturing only 
4.65% of payers of less than $500 and 3.02% of payers of $500 or more.  Interestingly, 
there are over 8% of both types of payers that make their first payment after 175 days 
(between five and six months) after being placed.  Such a long wait until a payment is 
made may be due to unemployment or other temporary financial hardship.  
Another important feature is Days Since Placement.  As described earlier, this is a 
measure of the time that each particular account was placed at a given collections agency.  
A common procedure for collection agencies is that accounts will remain placed for up to 
a maximum number of days without payment; if no payment is made within this time 
then the account is passed to a new collections agency.  After reviewing the data provided 
from this collection agency, it appears their cutoff is 180 days and that all the accounts 
were transferred at this collection agency simultaneously, i.e., no new account was added 
later, as seen in Figure 6. (The cutoff point for the other data set we analyzed, not 
included here, was also 180 days.)  In Figure 7, we observe that most payers tend to be 
placed at the given collection agency for a long time, i.e. 240 or more days.   
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Figure 6: Distribution of DSP for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of DSP for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
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Next up is Balance.  Both Figure 8 and Figure 9 demonstrate that balance 
decreases with frequency. It is very difficult to say a particular balance level is indicative 
of a payment class, i.e. nonpayer or payer of less than $500 or payer of $500 or more.  
For example, 60.84% of payers of less than $500 have balances between $1 and $1499 
yet only 28.89% of payers of $500 or more have balances within this range.  Looking at 
the nonpayment class, only 39.33% have balances within this range.  Borrowers with a 
balance in this range are much more likely to exist within the small payment class and 
less likely to exist in the high payment class.  Following this logic, borrowers with a 
balance between $1500 and $2999 are more likely to exist as payers of larger amounts 
and a much less likely to exist as payers of small amounts.  When the balances go beyond 
$4500, this large variability seems to diminish. 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of Balance for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
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Figure 9: Distribution of Balance for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
 
We next analyze FICO score. Figure 10 and Figure 11 suggest that the general 
distribution is focused on the lower-middle range of FICO scores, i.e. the 550-599, 600-
649 and 650-700 ranges.  There is actually a slight negative skew to this dataset, which is 
in line with the national distribution of credit scores which too is negatively skewed (but 
contrasts with the simpler data set not included in this thesis).  It would be interesting to 
know if different collection agencies deal with different profiles of customers, or if the 
distribution of FICO is always changing per agency at any given time. Further analysis of 
the figures and table demonstrate that there are very few, if any, borrowers with a score 
above 800.  This suggests that perhaps little to no borrowers with FICO scores of 800 or 
above will default. 
This feature seems to have a lot of predictive value.  Consider that while 4.13% of 
the overall population have FICO scores between 300 and 499, only 0.94% and 0.48% of 
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payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or more, respectively, have such FICO 
scores.  Borrowers with these FICO scores are very underrepresented within the payer 
classes, i.e. up to 8 times less in the payers of $500 or more case.  Consider another 
example – the 650 to699 FICO range.  Only 21.54% of the borrowers have scores within 
this range, but 35.21% of payers of less than $500 and 49.04% of payers of $500 or more 
have scores within this range.  In other words, borrowers with FICO scores in this range 
are very overrepresented as payers.  As this feature seems to be discriminating for most 
of the various FICO ranges, it should yield lots of power.  
 
Figure 10: Distribution of FICO for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 11: Distribution of FICO for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
After reviewing both Balance and FICO, it logically makes sense to consider 
Segment.  Segment is a feature defined by the client that combines two possible ranges 
for Balance with four possible ranges for FICO scores, leading to 8 segments.  
  FICO Score 
Balance Range Low Medium High Unknown 
Low 5 2 1 7 
High 6 4 3 8 
Table 3: Segmentation Scheme 
The majority of borrowers in the data set have “low” balances and FICO scores in the 
low/medium ranges, so it makes sense to expect Segment 2 to be the largest and 5 to be 
the next largest.  This is verified in the distribution of nonpayers in Figure 12.  The 
distribution for payers, on the other hand, is very different than that of nonpayers.  The 
largest segments for both payers of less than $500 and $500 or more can be deduced by 
examining their respective Balance and FICO distributions.   
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Figure 12: Distribution of Segment of Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
 
Figure 13: Distribution of Segment of Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
Notice that there appears to be significant predictive value with this feature.  
Consider that 12.86% of the overall distribution is listed as segment 1 (low balance, high 
FICO), yet 25.58% of payers of less than $500 and 30.18% of payers of $500 or more are 
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listed as segment 1.  In other words, segment 1 borrowers are represented twice as often 
as payers with regards to the overall distribution.  More simply, segment 1 borrowers are 
significantly more likely to end up within a payer class. 
  Consider segment 5 (low balance, low FICO) as another prime example.  While 
24.82% of the overall distribution are listed as segment 5, only 10.51% of payers of less 
than $500 and 3.47% of payers of $500 or more are listed as segment 5.  In other words, 
segment 5 borrowers are represented more than 2 times less often as payers of $500 or 
less and almost 8 times less often as payers of $500 or more with regards to the overall 
distribution.  Putting it even more simply, segment 5 borrowers are significantly less 
likely to end up within either payer class. 
In this dataset we also know how many borrowers actually provided phone 
numbers to be contacted.  Specifically, it was noted if borrowers provided either a home 
or place-of-employment telephone number.  There doesn’t seem to be too much 
predictive value here.  Whether or not a phone number was given yields little 
discriminating power in differentiating between nonpayers, payers of small amounts and 
payers of large amounts. The graphs are omitted here. 
We next consider Phone Attempts.  This, as with Days Since Placement, is 
another indicator of this particular collection agency’s method of contacting individuals.  
According to the client, the assumption is that agencies will randomly contact borrowers 
on their lists.  Here we note that almost 18% of cases receive at least 75 calls, which 
suggests a different calling procedure. Perhaps they are more persistent and in general 
contact individuals on average more often. No particular group, i.e. nonpayers or payers 
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of less than $500 or $500 or more, seems to be contacted in a special manner, indicating 
the calling is indeed random. 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of Phone Attempts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
 
Figure 15: Distribution of Phone Attempts for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
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We also consider the amount of times they are successfully contacted.  Note that 
the amount of times a debtor is successfully contacted is both a reflection of the inherent 
nature of the borrower and the effort of the collections agency, i.e. the agency must 
demonstrate a large effort to reach a borrower many times.  The number of times a 
borrower is successfully contacted has a considerable amount of predictive value.  While 
61.29% of the overall borrowers are never contacted, 69.3% of nonpayers, 15.44% of 
payers of less than $500 and only 7.14% of payers of $500 or more are in this situation.  
This shows that borrowers not contacted are represented seven to nine times less as 
payers than they are distributed in the whole distribution.  In other words, borrowers 
contacted zero times are much more likely to end up as nonpayers than as payers.  The 
opposite trend seems to occur as the number of successful contacts rises, i.e. borrowers 
are much more likely to be represented as payers as the number of times they are 
contacted rises.  Borrowers successfully contacted a number of times are much more 
likely to end up as payers than as nonpayers. 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
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Figure 17: Distribution of Successful Contacts for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
After considering both the number of times a collection agency attempts to and 
actually reaches a borrower, it follows to consider their Contact Hit Rate distribution.  
The rate for many payers is nonzero, but sharply decreasing as the hit rate increases.  See 
Figure 18, Figure 19.  For example, only 5.80% of nonpayers in the dataset have a hit rate 
at or above 15%.   
Recall that the hit rate is defined to be the ratio of successful contacts per the 
number of phone attempts for each borrower.  If the number of phone attempts grew 
more rapidly, the overall hit rate should decrease; this was not the case.  On the other 
hand, if the number of contacts grew more rapidly, the overall hit rate should increase, as 
was seen here.  Therefore, it is safe to say that the number of successful contacts grew 
more quickly in this dataset than the number of phone attempts did. 
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Figure 18: Distribution of Contact Hit Rate for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
 
Figure 19: Distribution of Contact Hit Rate for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+  
Another new feature to be analyzed relates to attempting to contact the debtor, i.e. 
the number of letters a given collection agency will send.  Note that this information 
merely is the number of letters sent and seemingly does not include any information 
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about whether or not payment is made.  However, as with the phone attempt strategy, it is 
possible that there is a relationship between payment, or the amount of payment, and the 
number of letters sent.  Perhaps after a payment is received, more letters will be sent to 
these particular individuals, thereby skewing this element of information.  On the other 
hand, perhaps the receipt of a letter really does compel borrowers to make payment.  If no 
relationship seems to exist, maybe letters are an ineffective way of trying to generate 
repayment.  Interestingly, we see that more than a third of payers of less than $500 and 
almost two-thirds of payers of more than $500 are in the last range, receiving more than 
eight letters.   
Figure 21 further depicts the distribution for payers.  Again, there seems to be no 
apparent trend for payers of less than $500 other than the fact that the frequency of 
borrowers generally decreases as the numbers of letters rise.  It appears that the same is 
true for payers of $500 or more until the last range is seen – almost a quarter of these big-
payers are contacted more than 20 times.   
It seems that Letters does have predictive value.  The most noticeable examples 
are for four letters and eight-or-more letters.  There are 47.84% of borrowers who receive 
4 letters, while only 11.35% of payers of less than $500 and 6.18% of borrowers of $500 
or more receive this many letters.  So borrowers who receive four letters are much more 
likely to end up in the nonpayer class.  On the other hand, borrowers who receive eight-
or-more letters are much more likely to end up as payers.  Consider that borrowers 
receiving eight-or-more letters comprise only 7.28% of the overall population, yet 
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34.33% of payers of less than $500 and 61.07% of payers of $500 or more receive this 
many letters.  
 
Figure 20: Distribution of Letters for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
 
Figure 21: Distribution of Letters for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Finally, we analyze loan equity.  Recall that loan equity is defined to be the 
proportion of the loan collected while at the given agency; it is the ratio of Amount 
Collected to Balance.  The majority of loans have zero loan equity, as the majority of 
borrower make no repayment.  From Figure 22, Figure 23 we see that for payers of less 
than $500, there are many, i.e. 36.9%, that have loan equity between 0.001% and 10% 
but there are even more, i.e.37.4%, that have 100% loan equity.  The large majority of 
payers of more than $500, i.e. 47.0%, have loan equity of 100%.  The observation that the 
largest group of payers make full repayment is unseen in the simpler dataset.   
 
Figure 22: Distribution of Loan Equity for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
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Figure 23: Distribution of Loan Equity for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+   
3.3 Input Distributions of Background Related Features 
We now analyze background related features. First, consider gender.  The review 
of literature suggested that females tend to default a little less than men do, while the 
conclusion is questionable.  Here, the overall population consists of over two-thirds 
males.  In viewing Figure 24 and Figure 25, we note that the number of females is equal 
in both of the payer classes.  Males consist of 68.81% of the borrowers, which is 
consistent with the distribution of males within nonpayers and payers of less than $500.  
On the other hand, 76.75% of payers of $500 or more are actually male.  Since males 
reflect a higher percentage of the population within payers of $500 or more when 
compared to the overall distribution, being male may indicate payment of $500 or more.  
Note that this indication still may be small, as there are still 68.16% of nonpayers that are 
males (and there are significantly more nonpayers).  Females follow a symmetric trend: 
nonpayers and payers of less than $500 are distributed the same as overall, i.e. being 
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female cannot indicate a likelihood of being a nonpayer or payer of less than $500.  
However, while females compose 31.19% of the overall borrower population, they only 
compose 23.25% of borrowers of more than $500, suggesting females are less likely to 
make large payments.  This contradicts the questionable conclusion of the review of 
literature. Note that some values were eliminated as the gender was unreported. 
 
Figure 24: Distribution of Gender for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 25: Distribution of Gender for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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The most studied feature within the review of literature was race / ethnicity, the 
next variable to be analyzed here.  Recall that the results suggested that Caucasians and 
Asian-Americans were relatively less likely to default while African-Americans and 
Native Americans were relatively more likely.  Here, it is easy to see that Caucasians 
comprise the largest group of borrowers, followed by African-Americans and those of 
Hispanic descent.  Figure 26 and Figure 27 describe the breakdown of each of these 
categories for nonpayers, payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or more.  Consider 
each of the ethnicity groups above and the claim of repayment.   
Caucasians consist of 45.47% of the borrowers, yet only 43.31% of nonpayers.  
They also consist of 51.84% of those who pay less than $500 and 62.13% of those who 
pay $500 or more; the percentage of payers of $500 or more that are Caucasian is over 
15% higher than the overall percentage of Caucasians in the population.  This all suggests 
that Caucasians are a little less likely to be nonpayers, but more likely to be payers of less 
than $500 and very likely to be payers of $500 or more. 
Asian or Pacific Islanders comprise an overall small proportion of the population, 
i.e . 1.5%.  This is pretty close to the proportion of Asian or Pacific Islander nonpayers, 
i.e. 1.36%.  However, the proportion of Asian or Pacific Islanders for payers of less than 
$500 and payers of $500 is 2.23% and 2.39%, respectively.  This indicates that this 
ethnicity is more likely to be payers than nonpayers, but not as significantly as 
Caucasians. 
African Americans seem to be at the other end of the spectrum.  They compose 
34.77% of borrowers, but 37.48% are nonpayers.  This suggests a higher likelihood of 
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being a nonpayer.  The proportion that pay less than $500 is 26.64% and the proportion 
that pay $500 or more is 14.03%, suggesting African-Americans are less likely to be 
payers of less than $500 and much less likely to be payers of $500 or more. 
This trend is similar with American Indians, as they compose 2.33% of the overall 
population but 2.48% of nonpayers.  Again, there are comparatively lower proportions of 
American Indian payers than there are of American Indian nonpayers. 
Hispanics tend to follow the first trend, i.e. there are relatively more Hispanic 
payers than nonpayers.  This can be a significant outcome as they consist of 15.04% of 
the population, a relatively large value.  Those with Two or More races follow the second 
trend, as there are relatively more nonpayers than payers; this group comprises less than 
1% of the total population, though, so the result is less interesting. 
Note some values were eliminated as race / ethnicity was unreported. 
 
Figure 26: Distribution of Race / Ethnicity for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 27: Distribution of Race / Ethnicity for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Citizenship seems to be a logical follow-up to race / ethnicity.  This feature isn’t 
mentioned in the review of literature, so the findings will be new.  In viewing Figure 28 
and Figure 29 it is easy to realize that almost of all the borrowers are U.S. Citizens.  It 
turns out that Eligible Non-Citizens are more indicative of payment than U.S. Citizens.  
For example, while only 2.56% of the population are Eligible Non-Citizens, 3.28% of 
those who pay less than $500 are of this group and 4.63% of those who pay $500 or more 
are of this group.  Recall these values, that are higher than the overall proportion of the 
citizen group in the population, indicate a higher likelihood of payment.  On the other 
hand, U.S. Citizens who compose 97.43% of the population also compose 96.72% of 
payers of $500 or less and 95.23% of payers of $500 or more.  Since there are relatively 
less U.S. Citizens in these payer groups than the overall proportion of U.S. Citizens, this 
group is an indication of a tendency towards nonpayment.   
Note that some values were eliminated as citizenship wasn’t reported. 
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Figure 28: Distribution of Citizenship for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
 
Figure 29: Distribution of Citizenship for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Another interesting feature to analyze is whether or not the borrower is considered 
to be a dependent of another person.  In this particular dataset, one is considered to be a 
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dependent if the aggregated gross income of the borrower’s parents was actually 
reported.  Note that the review of literature considered if the borrower claimed 
dependents rather than if the borrower himself was a dependent.  Figure 30 and Figure 31 
illustrate the distributions of nonpayers, payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or 
more for the two classes.  While independents claim 77.56% of the overall population, 
they actually compose 79.05% of nonpayers and only 68.24% of payers of less than $500 
and 68.27% of payers of $500 or more.  This suggests that those who are independent are 
more likely to be nonpayers and less likely to make payment.  There is a surprising 
almost 10% gap between the proportion of Independents in the overall distribution and 
the distribution of payers of $500 or more.  After seeing this result, it makes sense that 
the opposite is true of dependents. While they only compose 22.54% of the population, 
they represent a smaller 20.95% of nonpayers.  On the other hand, they represent a higher 
31.76% of payers of less than $500 and an even higher 32.73% of payers of $500 or 
more.  This suggests that dependents are more likely to make payment.  This is an 
intuitive result – if a borrower is the dependent of another individual, i.e. a parent, then 
that individual will likely either make the loan payments or assist in making loan 
repayments. 
Note that some of the records were eliminated due to missing records. 
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Figure 30: Distribution of Dependent for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 31: Distribution of Dependent for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Now consider the distribution of the borrowers’ parent’s aggregated gross 
income, Parent AGI.  Note that this feature is nonzero only if a student is still considered 
to be a dependent of his parents and his parents have some sort of income; otherwise, 
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Parent AGI is zero. Figure 32 and Figure 33 indicate that the aggregated gross income of 
75% to 90% of borrowers is in the $0-$999 range.  The overall distribution lists 83.24% 
of borrowers with Parent AGI in this range.  The overwhelming majority of borrowers 
are likely independent from their parents, thereby setting this feature to zero.   
As seen in the figures, there is a very small and decreasing nature to the trend of 
Parent AGI outside of the first bin, with close to 4% of the overall population with Parent 
AGI in the second bin, i.e. Parent AGI between $10000 and $19999, and less than one 
percent of the overall population in the last bin, i.e. Parent AGI greater than or equal to 
$100000. 
This feature seems to be very predictive within the first bin only.  As mentioned, 
83.24% of borrowers identify themselves with a Parent AGI between $0 and $999.  
However, 74.02% of payers of less than $500 and 73.89% of payers of $500 or more 
identify themselves within this range.  As borrowers with this Parent AGI are 
underrepresented within the payer classes, the conclusion can be drawn that very low 
Parent AGI is associated with nonpayment.    
There is a definite trend that as Parent AGI increases, so too does the tendency 
towards repayment.  However, this conclusion is not very strong beyond the first bin.  
Even though it appears in some cases that payers of $500 or represented more than three 
times than in regards to the overall distribution, there are still so few records in this latter 
part of the distribution that is difficult to say anything is statistically significant. 
Some records were eliminated as their meaning was unclear, e.g,. negative Parent 
AGI values. (This is true of every feature.) 
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Figure 32: Distribution of Parent AGI for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of Parent AGI for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Possibly even a stronger indication of payment class than Parent AGI is Student 
AGI, a student’s aggregated gross income.  As the student reports an AGI, it implies he 
must be receiving some sort of income.  While it cannot be said if the this income is 
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incurred during or post-schooling, the results are similar --being employed during school 
or having income after school are both indications of not defaulting and therefore making 
payment.  Figure 34 shows that the distribution for the nonpayers is relatively similar to 
the overall distribution of borrowers.  The overall distribution and the distribution of 
nonpayers seems to be exponentially decreasing, albeit with a small rise at the last bin.  
Figure 35 more easily demonstrates the distributions for both payer classes.  The 
distribution of payers of less than $500 actually seems to follow the overall trend quite 
well, while the distribution of payers of $500 or more seems to follow a more slowly 
decreasing trend, with a more pronounced last bin.  
 
Figure 34: Distribution of Student AGI for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
The same sort of result occurs here as with Parent AGI, i.e. a lower Student AGI 
indicates nonpayers while a higher Student AGI indicates payers.  For example, 
borrowers with a Student AGI in the 0-9999 range comprise 55.83% of the overall 
population.  However, borrowers with this range of Student AGI make up only about 
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44% to 48% of payers, a definite indication against payment.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, 1.86% of borrowers have a Student AGI of 70000+ while borrowers with this 
type of Student AGI make up 6.25% of payers of $500 or more; in other words, 
borrowers with this Student AGI are represented 3 times as often as payers of $500 or 
more than with regards to their overall distribution.  Clearly this indicates payment. 
This feature does seem to be a bit more indicative than Parent AGI. Again, some 
records were eliminated due to missing or unacceptable input. 
 
Figure 35: Distribution of Student AGI for  Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
As mentioned with the Parent AGI value, borrowers who are dependent on 
parents with a high AGI are indicative of payment.  However, just because a borrower’s 
parents have a high income does not necessarily mean that this income will go towards 
loan repayment.  This issue is resolved with this feature, Estimated Family Contribution.  
It shows that the majority of family contributions are small, i.e. in the $0 to $2499 range.  
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The rest of the contribution bins have small frequencies of samples – the frequency tends 
to get smaller as the contribution amount rises.  Figure 36 demonstrates the sharp drop-
off in values for nonpayers, while Figure 37 demonstrates a slightly less significant drop-
off with the occasional fluctuation for payers.  One would expect that the smaller the Est. 
Family Contribution, the greater the indication of being a nonpayer.  The data does show 
this relationship, and actually a little more strongly than in Parent AGI.  For example, 
borrowers with an Est. Family Contribution of $0-$2499 make up 79.37% of the overall 
population, but only 68% of payers of less than $500 and 54.09% of payers of $500 or 
more.  This compellingly suggests that borrowers within this bin are much less likely to 
be represented as payers than they are as nonpayers.  The other end of the spectrum 
occurs as expected, as an Est. Family Contribution of 20000+ indicates payment.   
 
Figure 36: Distribution of Estimated Family Contribution for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of 
$500+ 
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Figure 37: Distribution of Estimated Family Contribution for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
On the topic of a borrower’s parents, it would be interesting to consider their level 
of education.  Note that there was a field indicating whether or not a borrower’s parents 
attended college, but that is also contained within the Highest Degree of the Father and 
the Highest Degree of the Mother.  First, consider the Highest Degree of the Father.  
Figure 38 and Figure 39 all depict that the majority of nonpayers, payers of less than 
$500 and payers of $500+ have fathers whose highest degree is from high school, 
followed by college or beyond and lastly from middle school or junior high.  
Interestingly, this feature does not add much value in the distinguishing payment classes 
based on each bin.  For example, 14.69% of the borrowers have fathers whose highest 
degree is from middle school or junior high.  Similarly, 14.70% of nonpayers, 14.66% of 
payers less than $500 and 14.58% of payers of $500 or more are all from this same bin.  
Therefore, being in this range yields no indication of whether or not a borrower will pay 
or not.  Having a father whose highest degree is from high school yields a very slight 
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indication towards nonpayment.  The most significant relationship is that those whose 
fathers have a college degree or beyond are more likely to make payment.  For example, 
22.7% of the population have fathers with this degree status while over 26% of payers 
have fathers of this degree status.   
These results are somewhat counter-intuitive.  One would believe that a parent’s 
highest degree would correlate with income, so those with degrees from middle school or 
junior high would have the lowest incomes and those with college or beyond degrees 
would have the highest incomes.  As seen, Parent AGI is a good indication of payment or 
nonpayment.  Therefore, one would expect having a parent with a degree from middle 
school or junior high would indicate nonpayment and having a parent with a degree from 
college or beyond would indicate payment.  The results, as seen, were somewhat mixed. 
 
Figure 38: Distribution of Father’s Highest Degree for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 39: Distribution of Father’s Highest Degree for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Lastly, consider the Highest Degree of the Mother.  The distribution of borrowers’ 
mother’s degrees follows closely to that of the borrowers’ father’s degrees as seen in 
Figure 40and Figure 41.  Again, the majority of borrowers have mothers whose highest 
degree are from high school, followed by college or beyond which is followed by middle 
school or junior high.  The indication of payment or nonpayment is a little different here, 
though.  For example, there are 12.4% of borrowers whose mothers have a highest degree 
from middle school or junior high.  This is quite similar to the 12.62% and 12.40% of 
nonpayer and payers of less than $500, respectively, whose mothers also fall in this 
degree bin.  This demonstrates that a mother of this degree type will not help in 
distinguishing between these two payment classes.  However, only 9.90% of payers of 
$500 or more come from this bin.  This suggests while being from this bin may not be 
able to differentiate between the first two payment classes, it indicates that making a 
payment of $500 or more is unlikely.  Having a mother from high school has even 
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stranger results; it indicates that payment of less than $500 is unlikely yet payment of 
$500 or more is likely.  Having a mother with a college or beyond degree indicates 
payment of less than $500 but not much else. As previously noted with the Highest 
Degree of the Father, this feature does not yield what one would expect. 
 
Figure 40: Distribution of Mother’s Highest Degree for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 41: Distribution of Mother’s Highest Degree for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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3.4 Input Distributions of Academic Related Features 
Returning to the review of literature, the features most likely to add predictive 
value in terms of determining payment are related to a borrower’s academic experience.  
Generally, payment is more likely from borrowers with high levels of academic success 
and intensity.  Conversely, borrowers with poor academic records are generally indicative 
of not making repayment. 
The single most predictive feature was suggested to be a Student’s Academic 
Status, i.e. whether or not they graduated.  Here, the overwhelming majority of students 
end up dropping out of school before completing their degrees.  See Figure 42 and Figure 
43, with over 95% of borrowers dropping and less than 5% graduating.  Interestingly, this 
predictor does not seem to be as valuable as previously suggested.  Consider that 95.61% 
of the overall population drop out of school, while 91.63% and 92.66% pay less than 
$500 and more than $500, respectively.  This does suggest that dropping out of school 
indicates nonpayment more than payment, but not as strongly as would have been 
expected given the review of literature.  Considering the other group, 4.39% overall 
graduate while 8.37% and 7.34% pay less than $500 and $500 or more, respectively.  
Again, this does indicate that graduating implies payment more than nonpayment, but not 
as strong as other predictors.   
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Figure 42: Distribution of Student Status for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 43: Distribution of Student Status for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Not only was completing a degree suggested to be indicative of not defaulting, 
and therefore payment, but so too was progress towards a degree.  Here the feature Year 
of Study is considered, which represents the year-of-study in which the borrower took out 
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a student loan.  Note that this isn’t completely indicative of a borrower’s total progress 
towards a degree, i.e. it is not the last year he spends in school, but it does indicate some 
level of how far he got.  For example, a borrower that takes out a loan in his third year at 
school has already progressed to his third year.   
In viewing Figure 44 and Figure 45 it is easily seen that over 80%, of delinquent 
borrowers were in their first year of undergraduate when they took their loans.  
Specifically, 37% of the overall population were first years and new to college, i.e. they 
had never previously attended.  The remaining 43.91% were still in their first 
undergraduate year but had previously attended college.   The first years who have never 
attended college before represent roughly 35.5% of both types of payer classes, which is 
lower than the overall distribution; this signifies that new first years are less likely to 
show up as payers.  The first years who have previously attended college before represent 
roughly 38% of both payer classes while they represent 43% of the overall distribution; 
this signifies that repeating first years are also unlikely to manifest as payers.  This 
solidifies that students with taking loans in their first year are at more risk to not make 
payment given default. 
The next largest bin was the second year of undergrad, capturing 13.31% of 
borrowers, followed by the third year of undergrad with 4.31%.  It is likely that many 
students completed their second year in order receive an associate’s degree, a common 
degree at this particular institution.  One would imagine that completing this degree and 
second year of school would indicate payment, and it somewhat shows in the data.  While 
second year students make up 13.31% of the population, they account for over 16% of 
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both payer classes.  Similar results occur for both third year and fourth year 
undergraduates.   
An interesting anomaly occurs with fifth years.  Being a fifth year undergraduate 
actually seems to indicate payment of $500 or more, but indicates against nonpayment 
and payment of less than $500.  Given this group represents such a small amount of the 
population, i.e. 0.17%, it may not be a significant result.   
Graduate students also represent small subsets of the population and are indicative 
of payment.  This type of student is actually represented roughly five times more in the 
payers of less than $500 distribution than the overall distribution and roughly two times 
more as payers of $500 or more.  Clearly graduate students are indicative of repayment.  
Having said that, graduate students comprise a small amount of the total population so 
any conjecture is questionable. 
In further analyzing the data, the following conclusions can be made: first year 
undergraduate students are indicative of nonpayment; second, third and fourth year 
undergraduates are indicative of payment; fifth year undergraduates are indicative of 
payment of $500 or more; first year and continuing graduate students are indicative of 
payment.  The more questionable of these conclusions are for fourth year and fifth year 
undergraduates as well as graduate students; there are just too few samples within these 
bins to be sure. 
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Figure 44: Distribution of Student Year for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 45: Distribution of Student Year for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
While graduation from college was the single most useful predictor mentioned in 
the literature, overall academic success and intensity were collectively the strongest 
elements.  As they cannot be viewed as a whole, many elements contributing towards 
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academic success are analyzed individually here.  First, consider a borrower’s cumulative 
GPA.  Figure 46 and Figure 47 depict a negatively skewed distribution for the three types 
of payment classes, besides the large initial spike for nonpayers and payers with GPAs 
between 0.00-0.49.  As demonstrated within the figures, the distribution  of nonpayers 
has the least peaked curve, indicating a larger spread of GPAs, and the distribution of 
payers of $500 or more contains the most peaked curve, indicating a higher concentration 
of GPAs. The largest GPA range for nonpayers is 2.50-2.99, while the largest for payers 
of both classes is 3.50-3.99.  This mirrors the result suggested by the review of literature: 
the higher the GPA, the higher the likelihood of repayment. 
An interesting feature is the relatively large level of very low performers.  Of the 
overall population, 31.47% have GPAs between 0-0.49, which can equate to a grade of D 
or F.  Borrowers with GPAs in this range comprise 22.62% and 19.17% of payers of less 
than $500 and payers of $500 or more, respectively; this indicates nonpayment. 
Another particularly interesting result is that 4.84% of the overall population 
actually has 4.0 GPAs, a very difficult feat.  Borrowers with 4.0 GPAs represent 7.63% 
of payers of less than $500 and 9.58% of payers of $500 or more, which indicates 
borrowers with a perfect GPA are represented between one-and-a-half and two times 
more often as payers than they are in the overall distribution.  Therefore, having this 
perfect GPA does indicate repayment, as suggested earlier.   
Note that many records were eliminated due to the aforementioned problem of 
ambiguous values.  For example, some borrowers may have had GPAs of 0 but this as 
this was indistinguishable from a missing value, it was eliminated. 
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Figure 46: Distribution of Cumulative GPA for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 47: Distribution of Cumulative GPA for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Those with 4.0 GPAs obviously have achieved all As in their studies, but many 
have not.  In fact, most have failed at least one class -- with many failing more.  
Interestingly, the overall trend of credits failed seems to be quite close, at least upon first 
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inspection, to the trend of credits failed for both nonpayers and payers of both classes, as 
seen in Figure 48 and Figure 49.  However there are some large discrepancies.  For 
example, there are 9.46% of the overall borrowers who have failed between zero and 
three classes (really between one and three due to the fact that all records with zero 
credits failed were eliminated as ambiguous values), while these borrowers make up 16% 
of the payers of less than $5-00 and 19.43% of borrowers who pay $500 or more.  This is 
an extreme difference; it strongly suggests that failing very few credits, i.e. between one 
and three, indicates payment of some sort.  On the other hand, failing between eight and 
eleven or more credits generally indicates nonpayment.  This overall finding also 
parallels findings in the review of literature. 
 
Figure 48: Distribution of Credits Failed for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 49: Distribution of Credits Failed for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Another likely important variable related to academic success is Credits Earned, 
indicating levels of academic achievement as opposed to failure, with Credits Failed.  It’s 
easily observable that 68.18% of the overall borrowers have only between zero and 
fifteen credits by viewing Figure 50 and Figure 51.  That means that more than two-thirds 
of the entire population has earned fifteen credits or less, which is equivalent to one 
semester or less of a full-course load. This relates to a previous remark – recall that many 
people apply for loans in their first year and fewer and fewer people applied for loans in 
the latter years of school.  Perhaps the majority of people who applied for loans in their 
first years ended up dropping out of school; this would certainly account for some of the 
reasons why so few people applied in their later years, as so many people dropped out 
already.  Admittedly, another major reason could be that borrowers applied for loans in 
their first year and carried them throughout school.   Regardless, it could possibly be that 
the same people who applied for loans early and are dropping out are also the people who 
80 
are earning such few credits. The overall distribution, as well as the distribution of 
nonpayers, seems to drop-off exponentially, with a slight bump at the last bin.  The 
distribution of payers of less than $500 also seems to follow this pattern.  The distribution 
of payers of $500 or more seems to different than all the others, as it actually  
Borrowers who earn between zero and seven credits represent 43.86% of the 
overall population, but only 34.42% of payers of more than $500 and 28.44% of payers 
of less than $500.  This means that borrowers with between zero and seven credits are 
represented roughly 1.5 times less often as payers of $500 or more as compared to the 
overall distribution, and roughly 1.3 times less often as payers of less than $500 as 
compared to the overall distribution; this is a somewhat strong indicator. Borrowers with 
24 or more credits are more often represented as payers than not.  These findings follow 
the intuition that higher levels of academic success are indications of repayment. 
 
Figure 50: Distribution of Credits Earned for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 51: Distribution of Credits Earned for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
The figures show that there is an odd and non-obvious distribution to the number 
of credits attempted for borrowers.  There is a low frequency of borrowers past 40 credits 
attempted with some slight fluctuation.  The propensity towards payment increases with 
the number of credits attempted .  This goes along with the finding in Credits Earned and 
Student Year – the shorter one remains at college, specifically less than a year or 
semester, the higher the indication towards nonpayment. 
There are really no other trends with this variable, besides the last bin.  It suggests 
that borrowers who have attempted 72 or more credits are more likely to make payment.  
Specifically, there are 6.05% of borrowers attempting this amount of credits overall, yet 
9.24% and 10.74% of payers of less than $500 and more than $500, respectively, 
attempting this amount.  This generally says that anyone who attempts a lot of credits, i.e. 
72 or more which is somewhere between six and eight semesters with average size 
course-loads, are more likely to repay than not.   
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Figure 52: Distribution of Credits Attempted for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of 
$500+ 
 
Figure 53: Distribution of Credits Attempted for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
One last feature related specifically to academic success involves whether or not a 
student has been placed on Academic Probation.  It’s logical to assume that students who 
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have not been on academic probation are higher performers, and given the other 
discovered results so far, more likely to repay.  Conversely, one would expect those on 
academic probation to be more likely to default.  Surprisingly, given the relatively large 
number of Credits Failed, over 90% of borrowers have not been on academic probation 
as seen in Figure 54, Figure 55.  As expected, while 90.98% of the overall population has 
not been on academic probation, 92% or more of payers have not; this indicates that 
borrowers not having been on academic probation are more likely to be represented as a 
payer than not.  Conversely, if a borrower has been on academic probation then he is 
more likely to be represented in the nonpayer class than the payer classes. 
 
Figure 54: Distribution of Academic Probation for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 55: Distribution of Academic Probation for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
Note that a borrower’s collegiate program may be indicative of payment or 
nonpayment.  With this particular dataset, there were 110 possible programs and that is 
too large to consider for an analysis here. 
Other important indicators of academic success date further back than a 
borrower’s college experience, i.e. his high school and intrinsic intelligence.  First 
consider the borrowers’ High School Credentials, i.e. whether or not he graduated from 
high school or obtained a GED.  All borrowers have either a high school diploma or 
GED, as it seems they are a requirement to attend this particular institution.  As with the 
previously analyzed feature, there is a considerable gap between the proportion of 
borrowers receiving a GED or high school degree, as seen in Figure 56 and Figure 57.  
Borrowers with GEDs are quite underrepresented in the payment classes.  Conversely, 
borrowers with high school diplomas tend to be represented a lot more in the payment 
classes as opposed to their general distribution in the overall population.  A possible 
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explanation could be that those with high school degrees may have more motivation and 
dedication than those with GEDs, i.e. since they completed high school instead of 
dropping out, and these factors are associated with repayment and not defaulting. 
 
Figure 56: Distribution of HS Credential for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 57: Distribution of HS Credential for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
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The last academic feature to consider is the borrower’s Wonderlic score.  The 
Wonderlic test is a type of intelligence test, scored zero through 50.  As almost all of the 
borrowers have defined scores, this particular school must have required all borrowers (or 
possibly all students) to take the exam.  It would be logical to guess that the higher one 
scores on such an exam, the more likely he is to do well in school and, given academic 
success is related to payment, end up paying.   
Figure 58 and Figure 59 illustrate the positively skewed nature of the Wonderlic 
score of the borrowers, indicating that the majority fall in the lower-middle range of the 
distribution.  24.56% of the overall borrowers fall in the 15-17 score range, while 24.44% 
fall in the 18-20 score range.  This places close to half of the population in the 15-20 
score range; considering the highest score is a 50, these borrowers are scoring relatively 
low. Further analysis demonstrates that scores between 1 (zeros were thrown away as 
ambiguous values) and 17 indicate nonpayment as being more likely.  Scores between 21 
and 29 indicate payment of $500 or more as likely, but nothing about smaller payments.  
Scores of 30 or above indicate overall that payment of either class type is likely. 
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Figure 58: Distribution of Wonderlic Score for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 59: Distribution of Wonderlic Score for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
3.5 Input Distributions of Post-College Related Features 
There were two post-college related features analyzed in the review of literature: 
employment status and income of the borrower.  Note that student income was analyzed 
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in the previous section; it was unclear if this income arose while the student attended 
college or if it was obtained after college.  Because of this, and as it was related to the 
borrower’s background, it was considered earlier. 
This leaves the borrowers’ employment status to be considered here. Viewing 
Figure 60 and Figure 61 it’s clear to see that almost all of the borrowers have not reported 
their employment status, i.e. it is Unknown.  In fact, 98.96% of the overall population has 
not reported their employment status and 99.32% of nonpayers have an unknown 
employment status.  This implies that having an unknown employment status indicates 
towards nonpayment!  This is verified by the fact that borrowers with unknown 
employment status are underrepresented in both payment classes, i.e. there are 
comparatively fewer payers with this status than nonpayers. 
At the other end of the spectrum, 1.04% of borrowers are known to be employed.  
While they only represent about 1% of the overall population, 3.07% and 3.54% of 
payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or more, respectively, are known to be 
employed; borrowers known to be employed are comparatively represented more often in 
the payment classes than the nonpayment class. 
Being employed implies having an income, a necessary means to make any sort of 
repayment.  Those whose employment status is unknown are likely unemployed; with no 
income, a borrower is likely going to pay off only necessities and delay any repayments 
for student loans. 
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Figure 60: Distribution of Employment Status for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 61: Distribution of Employment Status for Payers of < $500, Payers of $500+ 
3.6 Input Cross-Correlations 
The data mining software KNIME was used to run the correlation analysis. Figure 
62 displays the correlations between features and targets and between 37 disparate 
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features.  (Not all of them are actually predictors as some are unknown at the time of 
placement, but they are still included here to find insight) and two versions of the target, 
Paid or Did Not Pay (discrete version of the target) and Amount Collected (a continuous 
proxy for the target).  There were actually more than 37 features, but some were 
eliminated as they were redundant, i.e. Net Balance and other versions of the FICO score. 
 
Figure 62: Correlation Matrix of the Dataset's Features using Colors 
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This dataset includes numerical and categorical features.  As there are multiple 
categorical features, correlation values may actually be calculated between them; this is 
done in the software for every pair of features by using Pearson’s chi-square test on the 
contingency table (testing for independence between two features) followed by 
calculating Cramer’s V (a normalized statistic representing correlation for categorical 
variables).  Pearson’s product-moment coefficient is still used to calculate the correlation 
between numerical values.  Unfortunately, there is no measure of correlation determined 
by the software between continuous and categorical variables.  Potentially, an F-test 
could be used to achieve this goal. 
The visual displays of the correlations confirm some of the findings above, i.e. 
relationships of predictors and Amount Collected, and posit some new ones, i.e. 
relationships between predictors.  The question again arises as to what level of correlation 
is “significant enough” to be actually plotted and further analyzed.  As there are 21 
numeric features and 18 categorical features, there are a total of 212+182= 765 total 
relationships that could be inspected; this is clearly too much.   Given this exorbitant 
number of possibilities, the significance level should be set relatively high in order to 
keep this section of the analysis manageable.  Let any relationship with a manifested 
correlation coefficient of 0.450 or greater be “significant” enough for further analysis.  
Note that the use of the word “significance” is rather cavalier here as there exist other 
relationships that are truly significant and yield important information. 
The most relevant, and perhaps interesting, relationships to examine are obviously 
those between the targets, Paid and Amount Paid, and any features with predictive value.  
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Table 4 and Table 5 display just this, where Table 4 looks at the relationships between all 
continuous features and the continuous target Amount Paid and Table 5 looks at the 
relationships between all categorical features and the categorical target Paid. 
Very surprisingly, and interestingly, the two features most related to Amount Paid 
are reflections of the effort of a given collections agency, i.e. Letters and Successful 
Contacts.  This strongly suggests that as the number of times a borrower is successfully 
reached by a collections agency rises, so too does the amount collected from that 
individual.  Similar logic applies to the amount of letters sent to that individual.  In 
addition, the Contact Hit Rate also is a somewhat strong predictor of payment; this 
should be no surprise as it is directly related to Successful Contacts. 
Some other strong indicators of Amount Paid are the amount of days the account 
is placed, i.e. DSP, the last amount paid on the account, the Estimated Family 
Contribution and a borrower’s FICO score.  Note that, unfortunately, most of these 
aforementioned features are unknown at the time of placement and therefore unavailable 
for prediction.  A few conclusions can still be made, though: as the last payment amount 
on the account rises, so too does Amount Collected; as Est. Family Contribution rises, so 
too does Amount Collected; and as a borrower’s FICO score rises, so too does Amount 
Collected.  These relationships are all somewhat intuitive, but still interesting.   
The one possibly non-intuitive relationship is between Days Placed and Amount 
Paid; it is suggested that the longer an account is placed, smaller amounts will be 
collected.  Initially it seems wrong, as one would expect the longer an account is placed, 
the more money will be collected.  After some more consideration, though, it should 
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make sense; it was demonstrated in the input distributions of Days Placed, Figure 6 and 
Figure 7 that most of the nonpayers are placed around 150 days.  Note that most of the 
payers were distributed after 150 days, but there are relatively few payers compared to 
nonpayers.  It is because of the nature of DSP’s distribution that the correlation manifests 
itself in this manner.   
Only one categorical feature, Segment, seems to have a good deal of predictive 
value with regards to the categorical target, Paid; the correlation coefficient is 0.269.  
Note that even though this is the most significant categorical feature for Paid, it is 
roughly equivalent to the fourth strongest feature with respect to Amount Paid.  However 
upon further inspection, recall that none of the four most important features for Amount 
Paid are actually predictors.  That inherently makes Segment appear to be the single 
largest predictor of the target. 
While the aforementioned features seem to be the ones with the largest 
information with respect to the targets, the others should not be counted out.  Considering 
that any classifier model will ideally use a multitude of inputs, most of the features could 
potentially yield value!  Individually these features may be yield weak learning and 
predictor models, but in combination they may amount to a strong learner and predictor. 
94 
 
Table 4: Correlations between Amount Paid and all other Continuous Features 
 
Table 5: Correlations between Paid / Did Not Pay and all other Categorical Features 
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Visualizing some of these correlations may be useful for better understanding the 
data.   First consider the relationship between Amount Collected and Contacts, as seen in 
Figure 63 and Figure 64, showing a positive correlation.  Clearly as the number of 
Successful Contacts rise, so too does the Amount Collected.  Separating the payer classes 
into payers of less than $500 and of $500 or more demonstrates that anyone contacted 
more than 26 times or so tends to pay more than $500, a very interesting fact.  Similar 
results can be seen in viewing the relationship between Amount Collected and Letters in 
Figure 65 and Figure 66.  There is a clear positive relationship and the interesting fact 
manifests that anyone receiving 40 or more letters makes payment of $500 or more. 
 
Figure 63: Correlation of Amount Collected & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers 
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Figure 64: Correlation of Amount Collected & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
 
 
Figure 65: Correlation of Amount Collected & Letters for Nonpayers, Payers 
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Figure 66: Correlation of Amount Collected & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
Before moving on to the correlations between various features, consider the 
relationship between Segment and the categorical target, Paid.  Note that as these are two 
categorical features, they cannot be easily viewed on a scatterplot as has been done with 
previous features.  Therefore, the two variables will have to be viewed in table format.  
Table 6 demonstrates this information, but no apparent correlation is visible.  Table 7 
demonstrates this correlation more easily by converting the numbers to percentages with 
respect to the Paid and Did Not Pay classes.  In viewing this second table, it is evident 
that certain segments do seem to discriminate very well between payer and nonpayer 
classes.  For example, borrowers of segment 1 are 2.7 times more likely to end up as 
payers than nonpayers as they are represented that much more in the payer distribution.  
Similarly, borrowers of segment 5 are more than 4.3 times more likely to end up as 
nonpayers than as payers.  As most of the segments have some discriminating element, 
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besides segments 4, 7 and 7, it makes sense that this feature has a relatively high 
correlation with the Paid target. 
 
Table 6: Correlation of Paid & Segment for Nonpayers, Payers with Numbers 
 
Table 7: Correlation of Paid & Segment for Nonpayers, Payers with Percentages 
Now consider some of the relationships between various features.  One of the first 
most obvious choices would be to look at the relationship between Successful Contacts 
and Letters, with a correlation coefficient of 0.587.  Figure 67 and Figure 68 clearly 
demonstrate that the two variables do tend to move together, as either variable rises with 
the other.  As can be seen in Figure 69, borrowers contacted roughly 26 times or more 
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who also receive roughly 40 letters or more seem to pay $500 or more.  This confirms the 
findings obtained individually with each feature earlier.  
 
Figure 67: Correlation of Letters & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers 
 
Figure 68: Correlation of Letters & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
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Figure 69: Clustering Effect of Letters & Successful Contacts for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
Another intuitive relationship is that between a borrower’s Parent AGI and 
Estimated Family Contribution.  As was discussed earlier, the higher a borrower’s Parent 
AGI, likely the higher the borrower’s family will contribute to his education.  This 
positive relationship is confirmed here as the correlation coefficient is 0.552, which is 
quite large given the other coefficient values within this dataset.  Figure 70 and Figure 71 
vividly illustrate this mostly linear relationship, confirming the above thought.  However, 
there is a major point to be considered: often the Parent AGI is zero but the Est. Family 
Contribution is not.  Recalling that a Parent AGI of zero will generally indicate the 
borrower is no longer a dependent of his parents, the above thought comes into question.  
Even if the borrower is not dependent on his parents, do they still contribute towards his 
education?  Or does this “family” refer not to his parents, but perhaps a wife or husband?   
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Looking further at Figure 71, there’s no discriminating power in this relationship.  
In other words, the nonpayer, payer of less than $500 and payer of $500 or more are all 
spread across the spectrum of Parent AGIs and Est. Family Contributions. 
 
Figure 70: Correlation of Parent AGI & Est. Family Contribution for Nonpayers, Payers 
 
Figure 71: Correlation of Parent AGI & Est. Family Contribution for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
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After reviewing the correlation matrix, it is apparent that there exist many 
correlations between Credits Failed, Credits Earned, Credits Attempted and a variety of 
other features.  Given there are so many, consider the second strongest among them – 
between Credits Failed and Credits Attempted with a correlation level of 0.576.  Note 
that the strongest relationship exists between Credits Earned and Credits Attempted, but 
the relationship between Credits Attempted and Credits Failed may be more interesting as 
Credits Failed seems to have better discriminating potential than Credits Earned.  The 
expected positive relationship manifests, as seen in Figure 72 and Figure 73.  This is 
another instance where there does seem to be a bit of clustering, as Figure 74 
demonstrates.   Interestingly through about 110 Credits Attempted and 40 Credits Failed, 
the distribution of nonpayers, payers of $500 or less and payers of $500 is dense and 
indistinguishable.  Past this, the distributions tend to become more spread. 
 
Figure 72: Correlation of Credits Failed & Credits Attempted for Nonpayers, Payers 
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Figure 73: Correlation of Credits Failed & Credits Attempted for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
 
Figure 74: Clustering Effect of Credits Failed & Credits Attempted for Nonpayers, Payers of < $500, 
Payers of $500+ 
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Now consider some of the relationships between categorical features.  First off, 
realize that there are again another series of related features – this time dealing with Year 
of Study, Citizenship and Dependency.  As Dependency and Citizenship have the highest 
correlation coefficient, i.e. 0.707, consider them first.  As mentioned previously, the 
features cannot be viewed in a scatterplot as they are not continuous; a contingency table 
(also known as a cross-tab) is used instead.  Table 8 is the actual contingency table, 
where each element describes the number of samples that correspond to both the row- 
and column-categories.  Table 9 displays the information in possibly a more insightful 
way by considering the distribution of the columnar categories with respect to the row-
categories.  In this particular case, no actual insights are easily viewable.  Clearly the 
majority of both independent and dependent borrowers are U.S. Citizens; considering it 
the other way, being a U.S. Citizen provides little to no discrimination over being an 
independent or dependent borrower.  Similar logic applies across this whole table. 
Perhaps, then, it may be useful to transpose the matrix, i.e. flip the rows and 
columns, in order to view the distributions of the other set.  These versions of the 
contingency table can be seen in Table 10 and Table 11.  Ignore the “Not a Citizen …” 
category as there only exist three samples.  Considering  that there are almost three times 
as many independents as there are dependents for both Eligible Non-Citizens and U.S. 
Citizens.  This is potentially useful.  Viewing the data the other way, though, is not – 
being either independent or dependent provides little to no discrimination against being 
an Eligible Non-Citizen or a U.S. Citizen.  While there are some observable relationships 
here, they are not terribly interesting; for this reason, the breakdowns of these features for 
nonpayers, payers of less than $500 and payers of $500 or more will not be considered. 
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Table 8: Correlation of Citizenship & Dependency using Numbers 
 
Table 9: Correlation of Citizenship & Dependency using Percentages 
 
Table 10: Correlation of Citizenship & Dependency using Numbers - Flipped 
 
Table 11: Correlation of Citizenship & Dependency using Percentages - Flipped 
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The other strong aforementioned relationships, i.e. between Year of Study & 
Citizenship and between Year of Study & Dependency, yield similar uninteresting results 
upon plotting in a tabular format.  For this reason, these tables are omitted. 
Another feature of interest seems to be Program of Study.  Note that this feature is 
somewhat strongly related with a number of other features, i.e. Gender, Race, 
Dependency, Student Status, Year of Study and Credit Hours Failed.  This is particularly 
interesting as there are over 110 possible categories within Program of Study, as one 
would not expect there to be enough samples in any one category for there to be a 
significant relationship.  Perhaps this is the reason, though, that the feature is so highly 
related to others.  Consider the “Not a Citizen ...” category of the Citizenship feature.  
There were only three samples, yet the relationship was able to be made that of the non-
citizens, there were 2 times as many independents as dependents. This at first seems to be 
fantastically interesting – until it is recalled that these percentages are generated off such 
a small sample.  For this reason, omit from consideration these relationships. 
As with the continuous features, there are many other interesting relationships that 
can be viewed between categorical variables.  Consider one more – Job Status & Student 
Status – as it will address a fundamentally interesting question: does graduating from 
school make one more likely to have a job?  In viewing the data with Job Status as the 
columns, as seen in Table 11 and Table 12, it is quite clear that almost all of those who 
are employed have graduated, and almost all of those with unknown Job Status have 
dropped.  This is quite interesting and has large implications for all students – almost all 
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of those who reported to be employed have graduated!  This quickly and largely 
demonstrates the need for a degree in today’s workplace. 
Table 14 and Table 15 also display the contingency table for this pair, but flipped; 
now Student Status exists within the columns.  This paints another interesting picture – of 
those who graduated, 22.9% are employed while 77.1% are of unknown status.  But 
recall that almost all those who did report employment were graduated.  Also, from 
viewing Table 14 it is obvious that of all the students who dropped, only 0.04% reported 
employment!  The insight here is that Student Status, i.e. graduating, is certainly 
important in terms of Job Status, i.e. employment. 
It should be noted that, while implied in some of the insights above, causality still 
cannot be said her with certainty.  Job status is likely post-graduation or post-drop, but it 
possibly may be during school. 
 
Table 12: Correlation of Student Status & Job Status using Numbers 
 
Table 13: Correlation of Student Status & Job Status using Percentages 
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Table 14: Correlation of Student Status & Job Status using Numbers – Flipped 
 
Table 15: Correlation of Student Status & Job Status using Percentages - Flipped 
As discussed numerous times, there are quite a few interesting relationships other 
than the ones that are mentioned above; refer back to Figure 62 to see the full range of 
relationships.   While they all are worth consideration, two of particular interest will be 
briefly mentioned.  
 Student Status is only somewhat strongly correlated with Job Status, Year of 
Study and Program of Study.  Surprisingly it is not highly correlated with the target Paid, 
as it was imagined to be.  This is supposedly the most important factor for determining 
whether or not one will default, but clearly not even close to being one of the top factors 
for repayment after default.  
Cumulative GPA seemed to be another factor that was related to a number of 
features such as Original Balance, FICO and Student AGI.  While not as large as the 
correlation levels of many of the other relationships, these three seem to be particularly 
interesting.  For example – think about the relationship between GPA and FICO.  The 
positive correlation seems to suggest that the greater a borrower’s academic intensity, the 
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greater his intrinsic credit score.  Perhaps there is some confounding feature, i.e. a 
personality trait, which is responsible for both of these positive measures. 
3.7 Implications 
Based on this, Table 16 displays the features that appear to be most important so 
far, sorted first by importance level and then alphabetically.  These features are: Age, 
Credit Hours Earned, Credit Hours Failed, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Cumulative GPA, 
Dependency, Estimated Family Contribution, FICO Score, Gender, High School 
Credential, Original Balance, Race / Ethnicity, Segment, Student AGI and Student Status. 
 
Table 16: Importance of Features based solely on Descriptive Analysis 
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CHAPTER 4: PREDICTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYTICS – 
GUIDING COLLECTION EFFORTS BY IDENTIFYING FUTURE 
PAYERS 
This chapter will cover the generation and description of models built to predict 
whether incoming samples will be nonpayers or payers.  We first build a baseline model 
using only the Segment feature and two types of algorithms.  This is followed up with the 
development of various, more advanced models that use the complete feature set and 
more algorithms. In the process of building all the models, a more rigorous method is put 
in place for determining importance.  The most important features, listed in level of 
importance, are: FICO Score, Cumulative GPA, Estimated Family Contribution, Original 
Balance, Credit Hours Earned, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Race / Ethnicity and Segment. 
The model we ultimately recommend is a boosted set of decision trees.  It 
theoretically can identify 34.73% of the payers in a sample dataset by merely considering 
10% of the sample, and can find 63.66% of the payers in a sample dataset by only 
considering 25% of the sample.  The algorithm was able to identify $223,155 in savings 
in 30% of the dataset provided, which represents only one collection agency over the 
course of one year. The benefits if this is extended to more agencies could be enormous. 
4.1 Original Model 
The main goal of this work is to generate a model that accurately predicts 
borrowers who are likely to repay money given they have defaulted on their account.  A 
first idea would be to use multiple linear regression models.  
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Multiple linear regression models have the appealing features that they are rather 
simple and closed-form expressions can be obtained.  A continuous target variable, also 
referred to as the response or dependent variable, is generated as the linear combination 
of multiple predictor variables, also referred to as input or independent variables.  The 
model is of the form of Equation 1 .  Within this equation let y represent the target 
variable, let wi represent the weight of the ith predictor and xi be the ith predictor.  
Equation 2 displays the template of the output more concisely using vector notation, 
where ω is the vector of weights and x is the vector of predictors.  The actual values for 
the weights in the regression are determined by minimizing the sum of the squares of the 
errors, known as the residuals, between the original data points and the regression line. 
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Equation 1: Multiple Linear Regression Template  
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Equation 2: Multiple Linear Regression Template – Vector Form 
The assumptions for a linear regression model are as follows.  First, there needs to 
be a linear relationship between each of the predictor variables and the target variable.  A 
nonlinear relationship will not work within the context of these models.  Next, the errors 
must be independent.  This is particularly important for models involving time; the errors 
of the model at one time must be independent of the errors at a subsequent time.  The 
third assumption is homoscedasticity, i.e. constant variance over time and between 
predictors.  Lastly, the errors must be normally distributed.  Many of these assumptions 
are difficult to check. 
112 
Although it is tempting to run a linear regression on some of the predictors 
analyzed above, to predict the “Paid (Y/N)” variable, and although it seems on first 
inspection that the coefficients obtained were statistically significant (low p-values in the 
regression statistics), there are two major technical flaws in using a model of this form.  
First, linear regressions are used to predict on continuous outputs and our target is a 
categorical binary variable.  For each record, this model will output a value between zero 
and one, not whether the borrower is predicted to repay.  Second, the model references 
the answer in its prediction due to the inclusion of the Loan Equity variable (i.e., 
percentage of loan recovered in that time period) for the same time period in the inputs.  
An example is as follows: an account is at its third collections agency and the loan 
equity here is positive, i.e. payment has been made.  The model uses the fact that 
payment has been made at this third collections agency to predict that payment will be 
made at this agency.  A correct way to use a field of this sort would have been to find the 
Loan Equity of a previous timespan and use that to predict for future periods.  For 
example, if an account is at its third collections agency, but it had positive loan equity at 
its previous two, then it is likely some repayment will be made during this period.  
Due to these issues, we develop a new baseline model. 
4.2 A New Baseline Predictive Model 
When classifying on a categorical output, two models immediately jump to mind: 
logistic regression and decision trees. 
A logistic regression is another type of regression, geared towards classification 
of categorical outputs.  This scenario will utilize a binary logistic regression, which 
generates classifications for two outputs class
algorithm heavily uses the logistic function, depicted in 
from zero to one, as seen in 
probabilities.  For example, if one lets P be the event that a borrower repays, then the 
logistic function could model this probability.
Note that z, the input to the logistic function, is referred to as the logit function.  It 
is a linear combination of the various predictor variables, as seen in 
is similar to that seen with linear regression above.  Interestingly, if one takes the log of 
the odds of an event, such as a borrower making repayment, this linear logit result
Training of such a model requires finding these coefficient parameters
output classes.  Positive coefficients increase the likelihood of the event and negative 
decrease the likelihood; coefficients of large magnitude strongly affect the
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es.  Consider some of the background.  This 
Equation 3.  This function varies 
Figure 75, and the output levels can be interpreted as 
 
 
Equation 3: Logistic Function 
 
Figure 75: Logistic Function 
Equation 
 for the various 
4; notation 
s.  
 outcome 
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probability and those small in magnitude do not.  The probability a particular sample, call 
it sample i, belongs to the payer class, i.e. Yi = Paid, given the vector of inputs, call it xi, 
and the vector of parameters, call it , can be seen in Equation 5. 
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Equation 4: Logit Function 
Pr   

     !"# $
 
Equation 5: Probability of Repayment Class using Binary Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression assumptions are somewhat lighter than those of linear 
regression.  The main assumptions require that there exist linear relationships between 
the predictors and the logit of the target variable, the absence of high multicollinearity 
(correlation) between inputs and independent error terms. 
Decision trees are a second option for generating relatively simple models.  The 
general concept of decision trees is to take a large data set mixed with multiple classes 
and generate rules that split the data into smaller, purer subsets.  Splits can be calculated 
multiple ways, and two of the most common calculations are the Gini Index and 
Information Gain.  The Gini index is a measure of the impurity of a particular subset; the 
Gini index is calculated for different splits and the one that reduces the impurity the most 
is selected.  The concept of information gain derives from information theory and 
considers the amount of bits needed to classify records into different classes.  Splits on 
different candidate fields are evaluated and the one that generates the largest gain in 
information is selected.  These methods usually return similar output levels. 
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In addition to split calculation, another important facet of building decision trees 
is the choice of whether or not to prune the trees.  Pruning is an extremely important 
technique that ensures decision trees keep the tree generalizable (i.e. good on testing sets) 
by reducing the size of the tree (and hence reducing overfitting to the training data).  A 
common technique in pruning is to force the number of samples in each leaf node to be 
large – doing this will prevent many arbitrary splits that likely just capture noise. 
The next step is to consider what predictors to actually use.  Since this is the very 
first model, let Segment be the only predictor.  Recall that a borrower’s segment captures 
both his original balance and FICO score, according to the scheme posed by the client in 
Table 3.   
After preprocessing (filtering of unnecessary fields, accounting for missing values 
and quick verification of the statistical nature of the data), the binary logistic regression 
was built using the WEKA Simple Logistic node.  The output can be seen in Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76: Baseline Logistic Regression Model Using Only Segment 
What follows “Class 0:” and “Class1:” in Figure 76 is supposed to be the logit 
functions for each class. These logit functions demonstrate the weight values assigned to 
each input feature, or its associated categories, as well as the constant.   In this case, both 
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equations are clearly 0; this indicates that even though Segment was input to the 
algorithm, it was not used.  As the logit function in this case is 0, using Equation 5 it can 
be determined that the propensity for both classes, i.e. Payer or Nonpayer, is 0.5.  Given 
the propensities for both output classes are ½ , the true class from which the sample data 
belongs is selected as the “Winner” for each sample, i.e. Nonpayer.  These two results 
can be verified in Table 17 and Table 18.  In Table 18, the red bars of the columns “Did 
Not Pay” and “Paid” correspond to the propensities of those events. 
Before moving on, we note that there are 19,279 samples within the total dataset 
yet only 5,784 samples classified here.  This occurs because the total dataset was 
partitioned in order to generate a training set and testing set.  The training set consisted of 
70% of the data, i.e. 13,495 records, and hence the remaining 30% of the data, i.e. 5,784, 
became the testing set.  This is done in order to test the generalizability of the new model, 
i.e. how well it performs on a dataset it has never seen before. 
The second thing of note is that, despite the fact that each sample will be 
classified as a nonpayer, the accuracy is 85.34%.  Recall that roughly 86% of the original 
dataset were known to be nonpayers.  If the model classifies each new sample as a 
nonpayer, then it should be correct about 86% of the time.  Similarly, 14% of the samples 
within the dataset are known to be payers, but will never be classified correctly.  
Therefore, the roughly 14% error rate also makes sense. 
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Table 17: Baseline Logistic Regression Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 18: Baseline Logistic Regression Model – Output Propensities and Class 
One of the best ways to evaluate a model is referred to as the gains chart.  A gains 
chart examines the relationship between the percentage of hits for a particular event and 
the proportion of the sample that needs to be examined to achieve that hit rate.  Random 
models, i.e. those which randomly guess one of two output classes, should expect 
“baseline” gains.  This means that to find 50% of the borrowers who will repay, one 
would have to comb through 50% of the sample data; this is very undesirable.  Better 
algorithms will force the gains up as early as possible, and identify most of the payers by 
only having to examine a small subset of the overall data.  The gains chart is particularly 
useful in this environment because collections agencies have limited time and can only 
make an effort to reach subsets of debtors.  If these algorithms perform very well, then 
they can suggest the best way to order the set of people a collections agency has to 
contact, such that borrowers with the highest propensity to pay come first.  Consequently, 
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the collections agency will become significantly more efficient and collect significantly 
more money. 
A very similar concept to the gains chart is the lift of a model.  The lift, for a 
given percentage of the sample that is examined, is defined to be the ratio of the number 
of positive hits generated with the model to the number of positive hits that would be 
generated without the model. 
Consider the gains chart of the logistic regression in Figure 77.  The y-axis refers 
to the percent of payers identified by the model and the x-axis refers to the proportion of 
the sample examined.  Recalling that the baseline model will output a classification of 
“nonpayer” to all samples, how are possible gains possible?  Put another way, if the y-
axis represents the percent of payers identified but the model identifies no samples as 
payers – how can there be any gains? 
This occurs because, while the gains chart certainly does represent the percentage 
of hits for a given percent of the sample examined, it also considers non-hits that can be 
discarded with confidence.  For instance, there are certain samples with which the model 
strongly believes are not of the class “payer” and is correct; these are actually considered 
a sort of hit for the model as it is performing successfully.  Both these views can lead to 
the understanding that a gains chart is about ordering the samples with the strongest 
propensities first. 
Examining the gains chart of Figure 77, it is apparent that algorithm performs 
rather poorly.  As an example, consider the tuple (x,y) = (25,29.18).  This suggests that 
by viewing 25% of the data, 29.18% of the samples can be correctly classified.  
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Similarly, 90% of the payers can be identified by viewing 70% of the sample.  The gains 
here are observably not much better than random guessing. 
 
Figure 77: Baseline Logistic Regression Model – Gains Chart 
Now consider using a decision tree algorithm, with Segment as its only feature, to 
predict repayment.  Within the KNIME data mining software, there are a large number of 
tree building algorithms.  For the model building effort within this work, two main 
algorithms were used: WEKA’s SimpleCART node and WEKA’s J48 node.  The 
SimpleCART node uses the CART method of decision tree building, which utilizes the 
Gini index as its feature selection criteria.  The J48 node uses the C4.5 method of 
decision tree building, which utilizes the Gain ratio as its feature selection criteria.   
120 
For this section, consider only the tree built via the SimpleCART node.  Some 
choices are needed to be made before the tree can be built, specifically, the number of 
records per leaf node, the number of folds for cross-validation and whether or not pruning 
is used.  The number of records was chosen to be 100 as it is a “nice, even” number that’s 
slightly less than 1% of the training set.  Cross-validation is a technique that partitions, or 
folds, the training set into a number of complementary subsets, where a model is built on 
one subset and tested on the rest.  This is used in order to strengthen the generalizability 
of the built models.  The KNIME software suggests five as a default and this is kept here.  
Mentioned earlier, pruning should generally be used in order to minimize the size of the 
tree with branches of little value. 
Figure 78 demonstrates that the output tree actually consists of one leaf that 
classifies all samples as nonpayers.  This goes along with the output of the logistic 
regression using Segment as its only predictor, classifying all borrowers as nonpayers 
too.  This is unsurprising given the rare occurrence of repayment and the lack of 
distinction between nonpayers and payers within the segment variable.  These results are 
further demonstrated in the scoring of this classifier, as seen in Table 19. 
 
Figure 78: Baseline Decision Tree Model Using Only Segment 
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Table 19: Baseline Decision Tree Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
While the output class for all borrowers, i.e. nonpayers, is the same as that of the 
logistic regression, the output propensities of this simple decision tree are not.  For this 
particular algorithm, the output propensity of the Nonpayer class is 0.859 and therefore 
the output propensity of the Payer class is 0.141.  It should be immediately clear that 
these probabilities represent the overall distribution of nonpayers and payers within the 
original dataset. 
This highlights the main difference between the simple logistic regression and 
decision models at this point.  The logistic regression here assigns a probability to each 
output class as 0.5 but selects the “Winner” class as Nonpayer as it occurs more often 
throughout the data.  The decision tree, on the other hand, assigns the probability to each 
output class as its relative distribution of the dataset and selects its “Winner” this way.  
The output propensities and Winner can be seen in Table 20. 
 
Table 20: Baseline Decision Tree Model – Output Propensities and Class 
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As the output classes are exactly the same, it should not be surprising that the 
gains chart of the simple decision tree model, as seen in Figure 79, is quite similar to the 
gains of the logistic regression.  Given the output propensities of the decision tree model 
were different than that of the logistic regression, it should make sense that the best 
possible ordering of samples (and hence resultant gains chart) is slightly different.  Since 
the output propensities for all samples are still the same within this particular model, 
though, it should make sense that there is still little gain to be achieved. 
 
Figure 79: Baseline Decision Tree Model – Gains Chart 
A summary of these two preliminary baseline models can be seen in Table 21.   
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Table 21: Baseline Model Summary 
4.3 An Advanced Predictive Model 
The gains charts of Figure 77 and Figure 79 demonstrate the overwhelming 
potential for improvement in modeling.  The new techniques that will be considered here 
are neural networks and ensemble classifiers. 
A neural network is a type of mathematical model that seeks to emulate the 
human brain’s neural processing method in generating classifications.  Each input 
feature, or category in the case of discrete features, serves as a node in the “input layer” 
of the network.  Each of these inputs connects to nodes in the “hidden layers”; there is no 
easy physical significance to these layers or the nodes within them.  Nodes from the 
hidden layer then connect to the output layer, containing the output classes.   
Each unit within the neural network is associated with a value; for example, 
inputs are associated with whatever the actual input is.  Inputs are often normalized to 
keep them all on a similar scale; for instance, all account balances will be scaled between 
zero and one.  The value associated with each unit in the hidden and output layers is 
generated using an activation function, i.e. a function that scales the weighted sum of the 
inputs to that specific node.  Activation functions are typically sigmoids, i.e. functions 
that crush inputs to small ranges and typically display an “s” like nature.  The logistic 
function, as seen in Equation 3 and Figure 75, and the hyperbolic tangent function are 
both examples of sigmoid functions. 
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The number of hidden layers and the number of units per hidden layer are major 
degrees of freedom when building neural networks.  This choice can greatly affect the 
accuracy and speed of the classifier.  A variety of other parameters, such as the learning 
rate, are subsequently decided.   
Once all of these factors are chosen, samples are fed forward through the network 
to generate the output class.  The output of each sample is then compared with the actual 
sample; if the prediction differs from the actual output class, the weights in the network 
are updated proportionately to the product of the total output error, the learning rate and 
the prediction level.  The weights updated begin at the output classes and end at the input 
classes, i.e. the error backpropagates itself through the network.  Given there is at least 
one hidden layer in the network, the aforementioned techniques describes a multilayer 
perceptron, i.e. a feed-forward neural network that learns via backpropagation. 
Neural networks are very popular algorithms as they can generate highly accurate 
outputs.  Furthermore, models with two or more hidden layers can successfully 
approximate any function, a highly desirable attribute.  Models usually need not contain 
more than two hidden layers, as a two-hidden layer representation should always 
successfully model a situation.  While these advantages are great, two major 
disadvantages exist.  First, training of an accurate neural network classifier takes a long 
time.  Consider that each iteration, also known as epoch, of training involves passing all 
samples forward and back throughout the network, and updating all of the weights 
subsequently.  With large datasets, and therefore likely large numbers of hidden units, the 
problems quickly become enormous and require a long time to train.    The second 
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disadvantage is that the output model is a sort of black box – there is no quick or easy 
interpretation.   
Ensemble classification is another method that will be used.  The idea, while 
somewhat counter-intuitive, is as follows: the combination of many weak learners can 
perform just as well, and in many cases outperform, strong single learners.  Here it means 
that the output classifications of many weak learners, i.e. learners that predict slightly 
better than random, can be combined to generate a classifier that performs very well.  For 
example, instead of building a very expensive neural network, with respect to time and 
space, a series of decision trees may be used in unison to output better results.  While 
there are many variations of ensemble classifiers, two will be used here: random forests 
and boosted decision trees. 
As its name implies, a random forest is a collection of random decision trees.  Let 
there be M total predictor features, m features per tree where m << M , T trees and N total 
samples.  For each of the T trees, m features are randomly chosen from the set of M total 
features and n samples are chosen with replacement from the N total samples.  Each tree 
is developed without pruning.  The output class for any new input is selected to be the 
most common output class predicted within the forest. 
A boosted decision tree is another type of ensemble classifier that tries to boost 
accuracy by focusing on the poorly classified samples.  Consider a set of three decision 
trees that are desired to output a unified decision.  Train the first tree on a random N1 
samples.  Generate the training set for the second tree such that there are N1 samples, half 
of which would be correctly classified by the first tree and half would not.  By training 
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the second tree with this set, it should clearly perform better on the samples classified 
poorly by the first tree.  Generate the training set for the third tree such that there are N1 
samples, comprised solely of samples that were misclassified differently by the first two 
machines.  A combination algorithm can be as follows: if the first two machines agree on 
the classification of a new sample, use it; otherwise, use the classification of the third 
machine.  Boosting need not be applied to decision trees, but it often is as the training of 
multiple decision trees should be relatively quick; the training of a set of boosted neural 
networks could take a very long time.  The most famous algorithm for boosting is known 
as AdaBoost. 
Beyond considering model types, another question is evident -- which additional 
fields should be used?  Which should be left out?  Ideally, we would like to use as many 
features as are provided. If the model determines no predictive gain in the addition of a 
feature, or category of a feature, it simply will not use it. Note that this paradigm of 
thought is acceptable when using smaller datasets; it is unacceptable when using very 
large datasets due to the “curse of dimensionality”.  This “curse” states that datasets 
become very sparse when the dimensionality of the feature-space grows extremely large.  
More simply -- when the number of features grows too large, not enough data ever exists 
to build an adequate classifier.  Feature-selection algorithms must be used in such 
problems in order to reduce the dimensionality of the features and hopefully build 
successful classifiers.  Given the problem at hand deals with 30 to 40 features, the curse 
does not affect that problem size and all features will be considered. 
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Another issue must be considered when choosing considering the best set of input 
features – the presence of the feature at the time of placement.  Many of the features 
provided with the dataset unknown upon placement, and therefore invalid as predictors.  
In order to achieve the end goal correctly, only values known at the time of placement 
can be used to generate a prediction of the future.  For this reason, the following features 
are eliminated from the modeling process: Amount Paid, Loan Equity, Net Balance, Days 
Placed, Days till First Payment, First Amount Paid, Days till Last Payment, Last Amount 
Paid, Calls, Successful Contacts, Contact Hit Rate, Letters and Job Status.  Job Status is 
interesting in that it may reflect a job during school or post-placement; since this 
distinction is unknown, the feature must be ignored when generating models.  Note that 
Student AGI is not excluded – this is likely known from the point of loan origination. 
The Program-of-Study feature is also ignored for modeling purposes as, 
mentioned earlier, there are too many categories to consider with too few records per 
category.  A potentially good fix for this would be to group programs by the particular 
school/college from which it generates.  For example, consider there are three schools at 
the reference institution: the School of Engineering, the School of Business and the 
School of the Arts.  Using these three categories would be a significant improvement 
over the existing 110 categories that render the feature practically useless.  Additionally, 
all but one version of the FICO score are removed as they are not useful or insightful 
predictors; the other versions are either agency-proprietary scores or incomplete.   
Given these aforementioned features are all removed from consideration, the 
following remain: Original Balance, FICO Score, Home Phone Provided Flag, Place of 
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Employment Phone Provided Flag, Segment, Age, Gender, Race / Ethnicity, Citizenship, 
Dependency, Parent AGI, Student AGI, Parents Attended College Flag, Highest Degree 
of Father, Highest Degree of Mother, Estimated Family Contribution, Student Status, 
Year of Study, Cumulative GPA, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Credit Hours Failed, Credits 
Earned, Credits Attempted, Academic Probation Flag, High School Credential and 
Wonderlic Test Score. 
Now consider the actual models.  First, look at the binary logistic regression, in 
Figure 80 and Figure 81.  There are a few immediate observations.  First, the logistic 
regression does not select all of the features and of the categorical features that it does 
select, it does not necessarily even use all of them.  The features used are: Original 
Balance, FICO Score, Segment, Age, Race / Ethnicity, Citizenship, Dependency, Student 
AGI, Highest Degree of Father, Highest Degree of Mother, Estimated Family 
Contribution, Student Status, Year of Study, Cumulative GPA, Credit Hours Failed Flag, 
Credit Hours Failed, Credit Hours Earned, Academic Probation Flag, High School 
Credential and Wonderlic Score.  (As an aside, it may look as if the model is not using 
Original Balance, Age, Student AGI, Estimated Family Contribution, Credits Earned and 
Wonderlic, but this is just because the coefficient is very small and rounded off to zero 
for display.)  Hence the ignored features are: Home Phone Provided Flag, Place of 
Employment Flag, Gender, Parent AGI, Parents Attended College Flag and Credits 
Attempted.  
Take a further look at some of the implications of the feature coefficients within 
Figure 81, which is used to indicate propensity towards or against the payer class.  As 
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FICO Score and Cumulative GPA are continuous features with positive coefficients, it is 
suggested that as they rise then so too does the propensity to be a part of the payer class.  
As Segment 8, Caucasians, Not Citizens and Not Eligible Non-Citizens, Father’s Highest 
Degree is Middle School, and 3rd year undergraduates and graduates/professionals or 
beyond have positive coefficients, then being a part of these categories is associated with 
the payment class.  Features, or categories, with negative coefficients imply nonpayment 
in this case. 
Often, the magnitude of the coefficient indicates the strength toward each output 
classification.  This can often be skewed, however, by features with generally large 
values.  Considering that Original Balance can span tens of thousands of dollars, its 
coefficient is going to inherently be very small in a logistic regression.  On the other 
hand, the categorical variables tend to have comparatively larger coefficients.  For this 
reason, it is hard to gauge the importance of predictors by merely analyzing the 
coefficients.  The only real comparison in general strength that can be made is between 
the variables that were selected by the model and the variables that were not. 
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Figure 80: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 1 – Nonpayer Class 
 
Figure 81: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 1 – Payer Class 
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As seen in Table 22, the model is 85.74% accurate.  Considering that purely 
predicting all input samples as nonpayers should yield roughly 86% accuracy, as 86% of 
the data are actually nonpayers, this result is not that great.  However, accuracy simply is 
not the best way to evaluate the models for this work; better accuracies are useless if no 
potential payers are identified.  If no payers are identified, or if all samples have the same 
output propensity towards repayment, then the model does not do what it was built for.  
Table 23 demonstrates that this model does predict that some samples are payers, and 
rather strongly.   
Note that false-positives, i.e. records that are identified as payers but truly are 
nonpayers, are somewhat cheap to deal with given there are relatively few positives 
identified at all.  Consider that there were only 153 records predicted to be payers; 
removing one false-positive would take the number to 152.  Now imagine that the record 
was actually a true-positive; the amount of money lost by not including this record could 
be large.  For this reason, false-positives are acceptable in the context of this problem. 
 
Table 22: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 1 – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
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Table 23: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 1 – Output Propensities and Class 
Figure 82 illustrates the gains chart using this logistic regression, which is 
drastically improved over the gains achieved via the baseline models of the previous 
section.  Note that at the 10% and 25% sample levels, gains of 32.12% and 59.41% can 
be achieved.   
Another type of logistic regression model was also used in the hopes of 
generating better results.  The gains chart achieved with this model can be viewed in 
Figure 83; it is clearly very similar to that of the first advanced logistic regression.  At the 
10% and 25% sample levels, gains of 31.764% and 59.412% are achieved.  For further 
evaluation measures of this model, please review Table 34. 
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Figure 82: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 1 – Gains Chart 
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Figure 83: Advanced Logistic Regression Model 2 – Gains Chart 
Now consider some decision tree methods; first, consider a decision tree 
generated via the CART algorithm.  Before viewing the result, reflect on some of the 
choices that were made in building the tree: 100 minimum samples were required per leaf 
node, there were five folds used for cross-validation and pruning was used.  The output 
tree, seen in Figure 84, succinctly describes a relatively successful classification scheme.  
Note that there are only two leaves with the output classification of payers.  To be 
classified as such, a borrower must either 1) have a FICO score above 632.5, have 
Estimated Family Contribution >= 16734.5, have Original Balance < 6011.86 and 
Cumulative GPA < 2.915 or 2) have a FICO score above 632.5, have Estimated Family 
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Contribution >= 6572.5, have Original Balance < 6011.86 and Cumulative GPA > 2.915.  
These results are simple and much more interpretable than the logistic regression outputs.  
Notice that the CART algorithm has selected FICO score, Estimated Family 
Contribution, Original Balance and Cumulative GPA as the most important elements in 
discriminating between payers and nonpayers.  Note that this list is in descending order 
of importance; as FICO was the first feature to be split on, it must have provided the 
greatest initial reduction in impurity. 
 
Figure 84: Advanced CART Decision Tree Model 
While the model performs more accurately than the advanced logistic regression, 
as seen in Table 24, this decision tree actually provides less distinction between the 
propensities towards payment and nonpayment, as seen in Table 25.  The real evaluation 
test here, though, is the gains chart and this can be seen in Figure 85.  The gains chart of 
the decision tree is clearly less smooth than that of the logistic regression, and upon 
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further inspection it is actually a bit worse.  At the 10% and 25% sample levels, gains of 
only 26.585% and 51.098% are achieved. 
 
Table 24: Advanced CART Decision Tree Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 25: Advanced CART Decision Tree Model – Output Propensities and Class 
137 
 
Figure 85: Advanced CART Decision Tree Model – Gains Chart 
Now consider a decision tree built using the C4.5 method.  The same choices that 
were made for the previous decision tree were also used here.  One additional parameter 
choice here is the confidence factor, which describes the level to which a tree may be 
pruned.  Smaller factors induce less pruning; the model built here uses the software-
defaulted confidence factor of 0.25.  The output tree can be seen in Figure 86. 
The tree of this model also generates an excellent output.  Note that the fields 
selected and used in this model are: FICO Score, Estimated Family Contribution, Credits 
Earned, Original Balance and Credits Failed Flag.  The order of importance of these 
features actually varies, as demonstrated in the output, with the branch of the tree.  For 
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example, the third most important feature for borrowers with a FICO Score over 632 and 
Estimated Family Contribution less than or equal to 67 is Credits Earned, while it is 
Original Balance for those with an Estimated Contribution of greater than 67.   
Note that the feature set of this model is not the same as the feature set of the last 
tree.  Common to both are FICO Score, Estimated Family Contribution and Original 
Balance.  The Cumulative GPA feature is unique to the first tree and Credits Earned and 
Credit Hours Failed Flag are unique to the second tree.  Academic success is undoubtedly 
important in discriminating between payers and nonpayers.  While the features between 
the two trees are somewhat difference, the accuracy and propensity outputs are quite 
similar as can be seen in Table 26 and Table 27. 
 
Figure 86: Advanced C4.5 Decision Tree Model 
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Table 26: Advanced C4.5 Decision Tree Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 27: Advanced C4.5 Decision Tree Model – Output Scores and Propensities and Class 
In terms of gains chart evaluation, this tree interestingly outperforms the first, as 
seen in Figure 87.  While its results are neither as smooth nor as high-performing as the 
logistic regression results, the model seems to perform relatively well.  The results can be 
compared in Table 34. 
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Figure 87: Advanced C4.5 Decision Tree Model – Gains Chart 
Transitioning to the next type of classifier, neural networks, one would hope that 
the improvement over the existing methods is vast.  Much of this desired improvement 
comes from the fact that these models are quite complex.  Some of the engineering 
choices to be made with this algorithm were the number of hidden layers, the number of 
units per hidden layer, the learning rate, the momentum, whether or not to normalize 
inputs, the total number of training epochs and validation set heuristics that could 
terminate training more quickly.   
As two hidden layers are all that is required to model any complex function, two 
will be used in this model.  As a brief look ahead -- while building the network, the 
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number of units per each hidden layer was varied; the only noticeable result was that 
training time significantly increased as the number of units per layer increased, without 
much improvement in accuracy or gains.  Ten units per layer achieved an acceptable time 
without crashing the computer, so they were therefore used.   
Also affecting the training time are the learning and momentum rates.  The 
learning rate and momentum essentially both deal with how quickly a solution converges 
to the minimum.  The learning rate is a value that determines how much weights are 
updated during backpropagation; the value was set to 0.3.  The momentum value dictates 
how much of the weight change for a given node at the previous epoch should be 
included in the weight change of the given node in the current epoch; the value was set to 
0.2.  It is important to make sure these values are not too large, since if the steps towards 
a solution are too big then a local minimum may be perpetually missed.   
The number of epochs to train was set at 300, providing a lot of opportunity for 
the network to improve.  This value certainly could have been set higher, but the training 
time would again increase.  The only way to exit training before the predetermined 300 
epochs is with the validation set.  For this model, the validation set size was set to 10% 
and the validation threshold was set to 20.  Basically, if 20 sequential epochs of training 
yielded no improvement in the training error of the 10% holdout set, then the network is 
accepted as-is.  Lastly, the inputs were normalized in order to help the algorithm in 
execution. 
As mentioned earlier, a neural network is a sort of a black-box model as the 
weights on the edges or the activation levels at hidden units are not interpretable.  For this 
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reason, the output of the neural network is purposely ignored here.  It is worthy to 
comment that all of the weights from the inputs to the first hidden layer appear to be 
nonzero, indicating that all of the features add some value to the problem. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the accuracy of the neural network was not as high one 
may imagine, as seen in Table 28.  The accuracy was 86.082%; while this is the highest 
accuracy yet seen, it is probably not statistically different from the others.  The disparity 
between the propensities toward paid and did not pay is better than with decision trees, 
but again surprisingly not as good as with logistic regression, as seen in Table 29. 
 
Table 28: Neural Network Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 29: Neural Network Model – Output Scores and Propensities and Class 
The gains of the neural network were also not as great as one would expect.  The 
gains, as seen in Figure 88, at the 10% and 25% sample levels were 30.713% and 
58.041%, respectively.  This model seems to perform better, based upon accuracy and 
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gains evaluations, than the decision tree models but not better than logistic.  What this 
suggests is that the training of more varied neural networks, i.e. different number of 
hidden units per layer, different learning rates and different maximum training epochs, 
may be useful in generating stronger models.  The main problems with this, though, are 
manageable training times and whether or not the system will have enough memory to 
complete the task. 
 
Figure 88: Neural Network Model – Gains Chart 
Moving to the last type of classifier, i.e. ensembles, consider a random forest.  
The only choices really to be made here are the number of trees to include in the 
ensemble, the number of features to use per tree and the maximum depth of each tree.  
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What’s particularly interesting is that the algorithm can determine the best number of 
features per tree and maximum depth in order to generate the best output, thereby 
creating a very unsupervised element to the learning.  The models were left to determine 
these numbers for the generated models.  The number of trees should still be provided by 
the user, in order to control the algorithm’s execution time.  The number of trees to be 
included in the ensemble was continually increased up through 50, after which the system 
always crashed due to lack of memory.  Perhaps running the algorithm on a computer 
with larger memory stores would offer the opportunity for better classifiers. 
The output of the random forest classifier summarizes the number of trees 
generated and the number of features per tree.  It is not particularly insightful here and is 
not included.  The accuracy of this classifier is actually the same as generated by the 
neural network model, as seen in Table 30.  Notice that the propensities for each output 
class are more separated, at least for the top seven instances of the payer class, than with 
the decision trees and neural network but not necessarily as much as with the logistic 
regressions. 
When evaluating the model in terms of its gains chart, Figure 89, it does seem to 
be the best seen yet.  At the 10% and 25% sample levels, the gains are 31.933% and 
61.705%, respectively.  Note that the first logistic regression examined actually had 
slightly higher gains at the 10% level, i.e. 32.118%, but this difference too is likely 
insignificant.  The over 2% increase in gains at the 25% level should solidify that this 
classifier is the best yet. 
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Table 30: Random Forest Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 31: Random Forest Model – Output Scores and Propensities and Class 
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Figure 89: Random Forest Tree Model – Gains Chart 
The last classifier to be built and considered is the boosted set of decision trees, 
another type of ensemble classifier.  As mentioned in the description, the reason decision 
trees are often used in boosting is due to the short time required to train many trees.  
Unfortunately, as mentioned in the description of the training of the random forest, the 
system used to train the classifiers has a limited amount of memory and therefore the 
training of boosted trees are subject to this constraint.  The implication here is that the 
special training of multiple CART or C4.5 trees, which are not generated with subsets of 
random features but instead all possible features, is limited.  After trying this with only a 
few full trees, the system crashed.   
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In order to circumnavigate this issue, the maximum depth of the generated trees 
was forced to one; this essentially forces only one split per tree.  The software refers to 
these trees as “decision stumps”.  The use of these stumps seemed to scale quite well, i.e. 
500 were trained in a relatively short time without system crash. 
The output of the boosted trees, as with the random forest, adds little value and is 
left out of this work.  The output scores and propensities can be seen in Table 32 and 
Table 33, respectively.  The accuracy level has once again risen, and this time by over 
one percent.  While it doesn’t seem that large, the extra percent of accuracy may be 
significant for good predictions.  While the disparity between the propensity towards 
payment and nonpayment is still not as great as with the logistic regression model, it is 
still relatively large. 
 
Table 32: Boosted Decision Trees Model – Confusion Matrix and Accuracy 
 
Table 33: Boosted Decision Trees Model – Output Scores and Propensities and Class 
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The gains chart evaluation of this model further demonstrates it to be the best.  At 
the 10% sample level the gains are 34.734 and at the 25% sample level the gains are 
63.659%.  The implications are large – by looking at only 10% of the sample, the model 
should identify over a third of the payers.  By looking at a quarter of the sample, the 
model should identify close to two-thirds of the payers. The results of this and other 
classifiers can be reviewed in Table 34.  
 
Figure 90: Boosted Decision Trees Model – Gains Chart 
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Table 34: Advanced Model Summary 
4.4 Implications 
First recall the features that provide the basis for analysis.  In the previous 
chapter, these features were determined to be “important” in discrimination between 
nonpayers and payers or not based on their input distributions and correlations.  Here, a 
more rigorous metric can be applied – whether or not the feature was actually used in 
models.  Note that not all of the models actually generated this information, i.e. the 
second logistic regression and the ensemble classifiers, but the other results are 
summarized in Table 35.  The features are sorted first according to level of importance 
and then alphabetically.   
Cutting off the highest level of importance at a reference level of three times, i.e. 
it was found to be significant in three instances, the most important features are: FICO 
Score, Cumulative GPA, Estimated Family Contribution, Original Balance, Credit Hours 
Earned, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Race / Ethnicity and Segment.  Note that two of these 
features, i.e. Credit Hours Failed Flag and Segment, are really just discretized versions of 
other variables, i.e. Credit Hours Failed and the mix of FICO Score and Original Balance.  
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This is extremely interesting information and demonstrates that the most relevant features 
for discriminating between nonpayers and payers covers a borrower’s background, his 
academic success and general information about his loan. 
 
Table 35: Importance of Features using All Analysis 
The best model consisted of a set of boosted decision trees, built by the AdaBoost 
algorithm.  The gains at the 10% sample level were 34.734 and at the 25% sample were 
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63.659%.  This particular model should hopefully be able to guide collections agencies 
and generate lots of previously unseen revenue. 
A quick test of this is to determine the amount of money that would have 
theoretically been recovered on the test set.  Recall that the test set consisted of 5784 
records, 799 of which made payment, totaling $1,035,388.65, and the rest did not.  The 
model successfully identified 148 of these payers, as seen in Table 32.  If a collections 
agency had this model and successfully recovered money from all of the accounts they 
classified to be payers and truly were (payers), they would have recuperated $223,154.84.  
This represents a sizable amount of money.  Recalling that this amount can be 
recuperated from 30% of a dataset for one collection agency over the period of a year, the 
potential for recovery could be significant when scaling up. 
4.5 Extension: Identifying Borrowers Who Will Respond and Pay 
After building the predictive models above, two areas for improvement stand out: 
many features that describe borrower behavior post-placement remain unused and while 
the models can help identify borrowers with the highest propensity for repayment, they 
don’t indicate whether or not the borrower is likely to take an agency’s phone call.  These 
two problems can be solved in the development of profiles of the borrower likely to be 
reached by the collection agency and make repayment.  These profiles will be 
prescriptive in the sense that they will guide an agency’s efforts in who to contact.  This 
is an especially interesting relationship as, from Chapter 3, it was demonstrated that the 
number of times a borrower is contacted by a collections agency is strongly correlated to 
the amount he repays.   
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General analysis and predictive models will be used to generate these profiles.  
The main step in analysis here is to partition the entire advanced dataset into the number 
of times borrowers were contacted.  A big issue to be careful with here is to ensure that 
the number of samples per contact bin is sufficient.  The bins were determined to be no 
contacts, one contact, two contacts, three contacts, four or five contacts and six or more 
contacts with the distributions shown in Table 36 in order to have sufficient records per 
bin. 
 
Table 36: Distribution of Contact Bins 
Realizing that the features that best discriminate between nonpayers and payers 
can actually change across the spectrum of contact bins, it will be important to find these 
features.  By knowing the features that change in importance for discrimination across the 
contact bins, profiles can be developed for borrowers that are likely to answer and likely 
to pay.  For this section of the analysis, IBM SPSS Modeler was used as its interface and 
node selection was very intuitive.  However, the features had to be partitioned into 
continuous and categorical sets in order to properly use the software. 
In order to determine what continuous features are important for discrimination, 
the Means node was used.  This node compares the means of the continuous features for 
both the payer and nonpayer classes and compares them.  The difference in means is 
calculated and a transformed p-value, i.e. the 1-p value, is provided as output to signify 
whether or not the value is statistically significant.  This analysis was conducted for each 
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of the previous contact bins and the result can be seen in Table 37.  Notice that the 
average rate of change was also appended as the last column of the table; this signifies 
how the importance of the factor has changed, on average, across the spectrum of contact 
bins.  Interestingly, all of the features begin to become slightly, and in some cases 
largely, less significant as the number of contacts rises.  It may be that the significant 
drops may just be anomalies in the data; for example, the reduction in importance of 
Credits Failed between the 4-5 contact bin and the 6+ contact bin is likely not significant.   
Another interesting point is that some of the features deemed most important in 
discrimination were not the ones that changed the most across the contact bins.  
Estimated Family Contribution, Credits Attempted and Credits Earned are all good 
discriminators on the overall dataset, but not necessarily across all bins.  The information 
within this table can also be seen graphically in Figure 91.  As suggested by their being 
boldface in the table, Credits Failed, Parent AGI and Original Balance seemed to change 
the most across the contact bins.  They all changed more than one percent. 
 
Table 37: Importance of Continuous Features across Contact Bins 
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Figure 91: Importance of Continuous Features across Contact Bins 
The same sort of analysis was used to find the importance of the categorical 
features, this time using Cramer’s V and another transformed p-value.  Its output can be 
seen in Table 38, and once again the features with the most change are designated with a 
boldface type.  In this case, most of the features seem to become more important with the 
rise of the contact bins.  The most significant of these changes occurs for: Race/Ethnicity, 
Home Phone Flag, Segment, Academic Probation Flag and POE Phone Flag.  This is all 
summarized in Figure 92 as well. 
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Table 38: Importance of Categorical Features across Contact Bins 
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Figure 92: Importance of Categorical Features across Contact Bins 
Now that all of the features have been analyzed across the contact bins, the most 
important features for each bin will be examined.  These features, once determined, will 
be used in a decision tree to generate profiles of payers within that contact bin.  These 
profiles will be generated for the zero, three and six-plus contact bins in order to generate 
representative profiles across the spectrum of contacts.  This will complete the analysis. 
A bit of difficulty comes again when trying to determine what is significant and 
what is not.  For the purposes of the continuous features, take the top four features as all 
the transformed p-values are close (or as many features with importance 1.000 as 
possible).  For the categorical features, take the features with an importance of above 
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0.100.  Using these criteria, Table 39 displays the features most important for each 
contact bin. 
 
Table 39: Importance of All Features for Contact Bins 0, 3 and 6+ 
The features indicated per each contact bin will now subsequently be used to 
generate rules for payers of certain contact bins.  Another difficulty when building the 
trees is to decide the minimum samples per node.  Generally this is kept up relatively 
high in order to pre-prune the tree, but this is not necessarily desired here.  The purpose 
of this section is to generate rules, and in order to generate rules the number of samples 
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per leaf must be lowered so a tree will actually be built!  Therefore, the number of 
samples per leaf in the zero-contact tree was set to 10, 50 for the three-contact tree and 15 
for the six-or-more contact tree. 
Consider the output rules of the trees generated for borrowers with zero. As seen 
before, when the borrowers are never successfully reached, they are almost all classified 
as nonpayers!  The one interesting rule here is that borrowers with an original balance of 
less than $233.20 and an Estimated Family Contribution of $4,053.50 or more and greater 
than or equal to 42 credits may never be successfully contacted but still classified as 
payers.  The strength of these rules is questionable, though, as few payers exist per class. 
 
Figure 93: Rules for Payers Contacted 0 Times 
The rules generated for borrowers contacted three times are a bit more interesting.  
Payers in this case tend to either have Estimated Family Contribution of $6400 or more, 
or have Estimated Family Contribution less than $6400 and  be in Segment 1 or 3 or 4  
and be of the race / ethnicity Asian or Pacific Islander or Hispanic or Caucasian or Two 
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or More Races and have Student AGI of $5219 or more.  If borrowers hit either of these 
categories, then they may tend to be payers likely to be reached three times.  Given that 
this work is only looking at a subset of the contact bins, three times can be generalized to 
a “few” times.  Again, the strength of these rules may be in question due to lack of 
samples. 
 
Figure 94: Rules for Payers Contacted 3 Times 
The rules for borrowers contacted also generate some odd, yet interesting, results.  
Practically everyone here is classified as payers.  But in order to generate some actual 
rules, consider the output.  The only group here not classified as payers are borrowers 
from segments 2, 5 or 6 that do not provide a home phone number and attempted less 
than ten credits.  The model suggests that all other borrowers are likely to be payers 
within this contact class. 
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Figure 95: Rules for Payers Contacted 6+ Times 
After reviewing all of the analysis and these rules, it seems apparent that the 
change in discriminating importance of the features across the contact spectrum is rather 
small, and the rules generated using these features to indicate payment within various 
contact classes is weak.   
In order to really guide the collection agency’s efforts, the boosted decision tree 
model of the previous section should be used.  It is true that the model does not indicate 
the likelihood of borrowers to take the agency’s calls, but attempting to call all of the 
borrowers with high propensities to pay is unlikely requires that much more effort than 
attempting to call all the borrowers with high propensity to both pay and answer.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
As of March, 2012 there existed over $67 billion in defaulted student loans.  
Creating advanced analytical methods that can identify borrowers with high propensities 
to repay is extremely valuable and relevant. 
The descriptive analysis section of this work examined input distributions and 
cross-correlations for two datasets.  Using this analysis and some conducted within the 
predictive and prescriptive analytics section, it was determined that FICO Score, 
Cumulative GPA, Estimated Family Contribution, Original Balance, Credit Hours 
Earned, Credit Hours Failed Flag, Race / Ethnicity and Segment were all the most 
discriminating features between nonpayers and payers.   
While the features indicative of outright student loan default are relevant in the 
problem of recovering payments post-default, the importance of the features have 
changed.  For example, the amount of the Original balance and Estimated Family 
Contribution are not suggested to be two of the highest indicators of outright default, but 
are strongly related to repayment after default.  Going the opposite way, the single most 
indicative feature of default is Student Status, i.e. whether or not the student graduated, 
while this is not one of the strongest indicators of repayment given default. Another 
interesting result is that the distribution of the input features seems to be non-stationary as 
they vary with the collection agency from which the data was sourced. 
After this analysis, predictive and prescriptive models were generated to identify 
future payers.  The methods of logistic regression and decision trees were used to build 
simple classifiers with only Segment as a predictor; subsequently, these methods were 
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reused, along with neural networks and ensemble methods, to generate more advanced 
models with the entire feature set as predictors. 
The best model, using the gains chart evaluation, was derived using a set of 
boosted decision trees.  Gains at the 10% sample level were 34.734 and at the 25% 
sample were 63.659%.  Using a small sample of the entire dataset, which covered a one 
year period of time, $223,154.84 was successfully identified as money that could be 
recovered.  Scaling up on the amount of data should generate large amounts of return. 
In order to further guide a collection agency’s attempts to recover debt, the 
importance of features across the spectrum of times a debtor is contacted was examined.  
This is relevant as the number of times a borrower is successfully reached by a collection 
agency is highly related to the amount he repays.  The features most important for the 
various contact bins were then supposed to be used in a decision tree algorithm in order 
to generate profiles, via rules, of borrowers within that contact bin.  This ideally would 
have guided a collection agency to debtors that were likely to respond to the agency’s 
efforts and make repayment.  Unfortunately, rules were not generated in all instances and 
likely statistically insignificant in others. 
`Given the magnitude of the student loan default issue, further work is much 
warranted.  Opportunity for further work exists in obtaining more features, more training 
samples, experimenting further with variations of the parameters used in the 
aforementioned algorithms and experimenting with new algorithms. There also exist 
more in-depth and worthwhile opportunities for further research.  It has been 
demonstrated in this work that many of the features examined are correlated with being a 
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future payer and/or the amount one repays.  Because correlation does not imply 
causation,  knowing that the relationship exists cannot help at the root of the problem.  
Often times there are confounding variables, i.e. variables that correlate and possibly 
influence other these other related variables. It is highly likely that many of the examined 
features are merely proxies for some confounding variable.  For example, Cumulative 
GPA, Credits Earned, Credits Attempted, Credits Failed and Credits Failed Flag are all 
indicators of a borrower’s academic success.  While partially a measure of intelligence, 
academic success can also be fundamentally described by a borrower’s motivation, drive 
and work ethic.  All of these things can further be described by a borrower’s personality. 
A great step forward in this direction would be to offer various personality tests, 
i.e. the Myers-Briggs personality test and McCrae and Costa’s Big Five personality test, 
and examine how a borrower’s scores correlate with all of the provided features here, i.e. 
academic success.  A borrower’s personality is likely is the driver for many of the other 
features examined in this work.  Determining a core set of personality traits would likely 
be extremely useful in predicting student loan default. While a borrower’s personality is 
likely a good indicator of default, his current situation in life is also likely a big indicator.  
Potentially experiments could be done in order to determine a fundamental set of life-
states, i.e. being married or having children, that indicate repayment after default or not. 
If these two sets of fundamental traits can be combined, the ability to predict 
future payers and guide collection agencies efforts more successfully will be extensive. 
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